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ABSTRACT 
The potential for conflict over water is enormous since freshwater resources are 
finite, unevenly distributed, and often shared by more then one country. However, given 
its importance for basic survival, industry, energy production and other fundamental 
components of society, water can also become a reason for cooperation as parties in 
water-scarce regions join together to manage this crucial shared resource. 
The Euphrates-Tigris basin is one of those regions, where equitable and 
reasonable distribution of water is at the heart of the dispute among the riparian states of 
Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. In the basin, the disparities among riparian countries are wide 
and some are already faced with constraints in meeting domestic water demand owing to 
physical, socio-economic and political factors. This thesis argues that the predominant 
factor that contributes to the conflict in the Euphrates-Tigris basin is the domestic 
concerns of each state rather than an overall shortage of water resources. Furthermore, 
this thesis demonstrates that although the rhetoric about a water war among the riparian 
states of the Euphrates-Tigris rivers has been popular in the last decade, it seems unlikely 
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Our planet is known as the blue planet due to its extensive reserves of water. 
Three fourths of the earth’s surface is covered by water. Unfortunately, 98% of this 
surface water is in the oceans. The remaining two percent comprises  the fresh water 
supplies of the world. More shocking, 90% of this fresh water supply is either in the poles 
or remains under ground. Therefore, we humans actually have easy access to only 
.000006% of the water available on the earth. In other words, only 12,400 km³ of 
freshwater is available for human consumption and use, and the renewable supply is less 
than 1 percent.1   
What is worse than these statistics is that the distribution of fresh water resources 
around the world is strikingly uneven. The world has not yet faced a global water 
shortage, but owing to the uneven global distribution of fresh water resources many 
chronic regional and local water shortages seriously threaten human life. The Middle East 
is one of these regions severely lacking fresh water resources. Although the increasing 
water scarcity per capita is a global phenomenon, the scarcity is particularly severe in the 
Middle East. This increasing aridity is mainly due to the region’s geography and 
environment. The other major factors that make the water issue so crucial are the rapid 
growth of the population and the increasing water consumption per capita in the region.  
During the courses of history, water has played a central role in shaping the 
political relationships in the Middle East. The following highlights the reasons that the 
water issue is problematic among these states: 
· Geography and Climate: The Middle East is one of the most arid regions in 
the world. Moreover the flow of these rivers is erratic and constantly fluctuating. These 
two factors exacerbate the problem of managing the water supply of these rivers, even if 
they are within the boundaries of a particular state.    
                                                 
1 Kent Hughes Butts, “The Strategic Importance of Water,” Parameters , (Spring 1997) p. 66 
2 
· Transboundary Character: Every major river in the region crosses one or 
more international borders and almost fifty percent of the population in the region 
depends on water flowing from other sovereign states.2  
· Population, Environment, and Economy: Increasing population, the level of 
economic development, urbanization and the lack of environmentally sensitive 
technology adversely affect the quality and quantity of fresh water in the region.  
· Political Uncertainty: The region is one of the most politically turbulent 
areas of the world. The two World Wars greatly affected the various societies in the 
region, and there is a severe lack of mutual trust among the states. Political disputes have 
made it difficult for the governments to cooperate over water. 
· Unreliable Information:  A lack of reliable and mutually accepted  
information about the overall inventory of water resources is another obstacle to 
resolving the water conflicts in the region. 3       
  After examining the main characteristics of and the reasons for the  existing 
water problem in the Middle East, assessing the importance of the water issue and its 
potential to threaten regional peace is useful. There are several points of views regarding 
the importance of water in the Middle East. One argument suggests the scarcity of water 
as the key factor in any future conflict in the Middle East. Environmentalists and 
ecologists, for example, draw much attention to water scarcity and population growth.  
The second argument accepts the idea of water as merely a contributing factor rather than 
the major source of any possible conflict. This viewpoint contends that the desire for 
water has not been and cannot be the initial cause of conflict among the states in the 
Middle East, and cooperation can solve it. A third viewpoint sees the scarcity and 
                                                 
2 John Kolars, “Hydro-geographic Background to the Utilization of International Waters in the Middle  
          East,” American Journal of International Law: Proceedings of the 80th Annual Meeting (1986) pp.  
          249-50.  
3 Several reasons exist for the uncertain databases about the inventory of water resources in the  
           Middle East. First, the water resources  have not been fully studied over a sufficiently long period for  
           reliable results. Second, figures for the same watercourse may vary because different “runs” of the  
           year have been used to establish an average. Third, data may be presented in different ways for a  
           variety of political reasons by the riparian states. See Greg Shapland, Rivers of Discord  (St. Martin 
           Press: New York, 1997) p. 4.               
3 
potential conflicts  as a technical problem. Engineers and economists support this 
argument4 and believe that the problem can be solved technologically.  
Keeping all these thoughts in mind, one can assume that given foreseen 
population growth,5 changes in climatic conditions, and the imbalance between water 
supply and water demand, the water issue will continue to generate future tensions. As 
for the coming decades, water will rapidly and undoubtedly become as precious as oil.  
Under these circumstances, the equitable and reasonable use of the Euphrates-
Tigris rivers, which are the most important sources of fresh water after the Nile, lies at 
the heart of political disputes among the riparian states, namely Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. 
Since the respective water policies of each riparian state favors its own domestic 
concerns and national agendas, these policies deeply  impact the present and future 
relations of these states. Therefore, a sound understanding of the reasons for disputes 
over the Euphrates-Tigris Rivers is necessary in order to reconcile the conflicts and to 
stabilize the region. 
Given the significance of water in the region, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq want  to use 
the Euphrates-Tigris rivers for their industrial and agricultural developments as well as 
for addressing their ethno-political concerns. But since the water resources of these twin 
rivers are important for the riparian states largely for the same reasons, the respective 
projects of each state for using the rivers have caused great tensions among them. For 
example, in 1975, Syria and Iraq came very close to a full-scale war when Syria blocked 
the water flood in the Euphrates River.6  
                                                 
4 Rossina Hassoun, “Water between Arabs and Israelis” in John Donahue & Barbara Johnston (ed.),  
          Water, Culture and Power (Washington: Island Press, 1998) p. 314.   
5 The population growth rate of the Middle East is among the highest in the world; by the turn of  
           the century the population will reach 423 million, and it is expected to double 25 years  
           thereafter. For detailed information see Itamar Ya’ar, “Water Disputes as Factors in the Middle East  
           Conflicts” Seaford House Papers,  Selected Papers of the Royal College of Defense Studies, 1994,  
           p. 48. 
6 Both Syria and Iraq deployed troops along their borders and a direct clash was   
           prevented by the  mediation of Saudi Arabia and the former Soviet Union. See Michael Schulz,  
           “Turkey, Syria, and Iraq: A Hydropolitical Security Complex” in Leif Ohlsson (ed.), Hydropolitics  
           (London: Zed Books, 1995) p. 105.   
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 The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the reasons for the conflict in the 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin. Rather than exploring the equitable use of the Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers only from a technical aspect, the thesis emphasizes  the reasons that make 
the issue particularly thorny among the disputing parties. In this thesis, I argue that the 
predominant factor contributing to the conflict is not an overall shortage of water 
resources in the basin, but rather the domestic concerns of each country. The domestic 
concerns of each riparian state significantly shape the policies of settling the Euphrates-
Tigris river conflicts. Specifically the main arguments addressed in this thesis are 
· Turkey’s policy shift in the 1980s from using the GAP project only for 
hydroelectrical purposes to using it as an integrated regional development program; the 
reasons for and the consequences of Turkey’s policy change both domestically and 
internationally; 
· The importance of  the Euphrates River for Syria as its major source of  
fresh water and Syria’s domestic concerns for maintaining the flow of the Euphrates 
River; 
· Iraq’s position as the southernmost riparian state in the Euphrates-Tigris 
river system, and its need for water for the survival of the state’s regime; 
· An assessment of the domestic concerns of each country that significantly 
shape its policies in the water conflict and the strategic consequences of these foreign 
policies in the Middle East. 
It must be emphasized that although competition for water is a major challenge 
facing the Middle East, presently an armed conflict seems unlikely to erupt among the 
riparian states of the Euphrates-Tigris basin.7 However, since the water issue is involved 
in regional political affairs and is exacerbated by other disputes, solving the problem 
becomes difficult due to the respective policies of each riparian state. Certainly, the 
                                                 
7 Frederick M. Lorenz and Edward J. Erickson, The Euphrates Triangle: Security Implications 
   of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (Washington: National Defense University, 1993) pp. 43-46 
5 
Euphrates-Tigris river basin can accommodate all hydroelectric, irrigation and regional 
developments that the riparian states require.8 What must be accomplished is the 
equitable and reasonable use of the river basin, which will satisfy the demands of all the 
riparian states. This in turn will settle the ongoing disagreements among the riparian 
states and will stabilize the region. 
 While defining the framework of the equitable and reasonable use of the rivers to 
maintain peace and stability, this thesis analyzes the relations between regional security 
and the environment of the Euphrates-Tigris basin. Since Turkey has an upper hand in 
shaping the politics of water due to its geographic location in the basin, the focus will be 
on the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP, the Turkish acronym) to clarify whether the 
project will bring prosperity and stability or whether it will begin new quarrels in the 
region.  
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter will briefly explain the 
geography of the Euphrates-Tigris basin and its historical use in the region for agriculture 
and hydroelectric power. In the second chapter, technical issues of water usage and the 
Euphrates-Tigris rivers among Turkey, Syria and Iraq will be analyzed. The third chapter 
presents a description of Turkey’s GAP project in terms of the geography, engineering, 
power capacity, and irrigation potential and the reasons for Turkey’s need for water 
considering the geographical, agricultural, and demographic characteristics of the 
Euphrates-Tigris basin. The fourth chapter addresses the importance of water for Syria 
and details the Syrian arguments regarding the Syria’s economic, political, ethnic and 
domestic concerns. The fifth chapter examines the same issues regarding Iraq. The sixth 
chapter analyzes international organizations and international laws that concern the use of  
international watercourses. The conclusion assesses the implications of the Euphrates-
Tigris river dispute in the overall political agenda of the Middle East. This final chapter 
also evaluates the future prospects for cooperation in the region.  
 
                                                 
8 Michael Schulz, “Turkey, Syria, and Iraq: A Hydropolitical Security Complex” in Leif Ohlsson (ed.),  
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 II. THE HYDROGRAPHY OF THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS  
         RIVERS AND THE HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF 
WATER USE IN THE BASIN  
 
A. HYDROGRAPHY OF THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS BASIN  
  
The Euphrates and Tigris rivers are the two longest rivers in southwest Asia. They 
drain an area of around 900, 000 km². Like the Nile, these twin rivers are “exotic rivers,” 
which derive their waters outside the region through which they flow. 9  They both rise in 
the highlands of eastern Turkey at a distance of 30 km from each other. (See Map 1) 
These headwater districts, enriched by autumn and spring rains and sustained by winter 
snows, nourish the two rivers which run separately onto the wide and relatively drier 
plain of Mesopotamia.   
The Euphrates is longer than the Tigris with a total length of 2,700 kilometers 
(1,674 miles), of which some 40 percent is in Turkey, 25 percent in Syria, and 35 percent 
in Iraq. The Euphrates covers an area of 444, 000 km², which includes surface tributaries 
and wadis. The Euphrates River brings hydropower and irrigation to parts of southeastern 
Turkey as well as water to the Mesopotamian lowlands of Iraq and much of northern and 
eastern Syria. Two main tributaries; the Karasu and the Murat in Turkey form the 
Euphrates. The combined stream then flows through southeastern Turkey and crosses into 
Syria. During its course of 675 km. through Syria, the Euphrates is met by two other 
tributaries: the Balikh and the Khabur, both of which also originate in Turkey. 10 Before 
reaching the Persian Gulf, the Euphrates enters the alluvial lowlands of Mesopotamia 
near Hit in Iraq. The river then divides into some channels; some of these channels flow 
into Lake Hammar and the others join the Tigris River flowing down from the east. This 
mainstream to the head of the Gulf is known as Shatt al-Arab. The annual flow of the 
                                                 
 9  John F. Kolars, William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development  
           Project, (Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991) p. 4.   
10 Daniel Hillel, Rivers of Eden: The Struggle for Water and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East 
            (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 92. 
8 
Euphrates is about 30 billion cubic meters per year at the point where it enters Syria from 
Turkey. After meeting two tributaries in Syria, this flow increases to 32 billion cubic 
meters per year at its entrance into Iraq. During its course of 1,000 kilometers through 
Iraq, the flow of the river increases no further.11            
Unlike the Euphrates, the Tigris River is divided only between Turkey and Iraq, 
apart from a span of approximetly 40 kilometers where it forms the boundary first 
between Turkey and Syria and then between Syria and Iraq. The Tigris has a total length 
of 1,900 kilometers, of which about 20 percent lies in Turkey, 78 percent in Iraq, and 
only 2 percent lies along the pointed northeastern corner of Syria.12 The Tigris rises in 
eastern Turkey near Lake Hazar and flows downstream where it forms the border 
between Turkey and Syria for 32 km before entering Iraq. On its journey through Iraq, 
the Tigris is joined by other tributaries. Of these tributaries the Greater Zap originates 
from Turkey, the other three, the Lesser Zap, the Adhaim, and the Diyala, flow westward 
from the Zagros Mountains of Iran. The Tigris River covers an overall area of 470, 000 
km². Although shorter than the Euphrates in length, the Tigris has a greater volume. The 
average annual flow of the Tigris at Cizre, the point where the river leaves the Turkish 
territories, is around 19.7 billion cubic meters. With the tributaries that join the Tigris in 
Iraq, the flow of the river reaches approximately 42 billion cubic meters per year. 13 
One of the significant characteristics of the Euphrates-Tigris basin is the annual 
fluctuations in the volumes of both rivers. The discharges of these two rivers are subject 
to extreme changes both annually and seasonally. The main reason for these variations is 
that the flows of both rivers depend greatly on climatic conditions. The waters of the 
Euphrates are derived mainly from melting snow in the mountains of eastern Turkey. The 
river’s highest flow comes in spring and early summer and the low flow appears from 
                                                 
11 Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S. Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context for Conflict 
     or Co-operation? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) p. 121.     
12 Greg Shapland, Rivers of Discord: International Water Disputes in the Middle East (New York: St.  
      Martin’s Press, 1997) p. 105.  
13 Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and Cooperation in  International            
      River Basins (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999) p. 124.  
9 
July to October. As a result of these changes, a substantial difference occurs in the 
volume of water carried by the Euphrates through the year; in April and May the flow 
becomes eight times higher than that in August and October.14 
 As with the Euphrates, the volume of the Tigris River also varies annually and 
seasonally. The pattern of seasonal variation in the flow of the Tigris also resembles that 
of the Euphrates. Owing to the location of the Tigris River near the foot of the Zagros 
Mountains, the tributaries joining it carry both melting snows and rainfall in the warmer 
months. Consequently, peak flows come in April and the low flows in September and 
October. Contrary to the Euphrates, the volume of the Tigris also varies at any given 
point during its journey from eastern Anatolia to the Gulf. At Baghdad, the maximum-
recorded flow is nearly 13,000 m³/s, whereas it is only 5,200 m³/s in the upper parts of 
Iraq.15 Furthermore, the fluctuations in the flow of the Tigris is much greater than the 
variations in the discharge of the Euphrates. For instance, the maximum flow in the Tigris 
can be almost eighty times higher than the minimum flow whereas in the Euphrates the 
recorded peak flow is nearly twenty-eight times higher than the lowest flow. Thus it can 
be assumed that the Euphrates has a more regular regime because of its greater length and 
fewer downstream tributaries. And when compared with the Euphrates, the Tigris River 
is less important for agriculture because of the violent nature of its main stream.16   
The end result of these wild fluctuations in the rivers’ flows is very unfavorable as 
far as agriculture is concerned in the basin. The seasonal rise of the flow in both rivers is 
too late for winter crops and too early for summer crops. This means that the construction 
of large storage facilities is of pivotal importance to ensure a steady availability of water 
for agricultural and other needs. Since both rivers are subject to major fluctuations, a 
                                                 
14 Joffe, George, “The Issue of Water in the Middle East and North Africa” in Thomas, Caroline and  
     Howlett, Darryl (eds.), Resource Politics: Fresh Water and Regional Relations (Buckingham: Open  
     University Press, 1993) p. 73.   
15 John F. Kolars, William A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and the Southeast Anatolia Development  
     Project, (Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991) p. 7.  
16 Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River  
     Basins (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999) p. 127, See also Thomas Naff and  
     Ryth C, Marson, eds. Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?  (Boulder, Colo.:  
     Westview Press, 1984) p. 87.     
10 
considerable engineering capacity and an efficient water management system are required 
to control the rivers’ flow effectively. Thus, on the one hand, the dam-building facilities 
of upstream states cause controversy in the basin, on the other hand, these projects are not 
only beneficial but also necessary for the downstream states as the projects regulate the 
discharge of the rivers in favor of the downstream states.17  
Another common feature of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers is the high 
concentration of sedimentation in their waters, especially during seasonal floods. During 
the flood seasons, these rivers carry as much as three million tons of eroded soil from the 
highlands. Little of this sediment reaches the sea, while most of the material settles along 
the Mesopotamian Plain and provides the lowlands of Mesopotamia with rich deposits of 
alluvium. In addition to deteriorating agricultural production, one of the long-term 
repercussions of this high concentration of sediment in the waters of the Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers is its adverse effect on the storage capacity of the artificial reservoirs 
constructed by the riparian states.18   
As in many international basins, environmental degradation and pollution are 
other great concerns in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. Dumping of untreated sewage in the 
two rivers and their tributaries has already led to serious health problems in Syria and 
Iraq. Although some sewage treatment plants have been built in Syria in recent years, the 
level of pollution remains a grave concern in the lower basins of Iraq.19     
                                                 
17 Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S. Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context for Conflict  or  
      Co-operation? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) p. 123.     
18 Daniel Hillel, Rivers of Eden: The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (New York: Oxford  
      University Press, 1994) p. 93.  
19 To deal with the problems of waterborne pollution, a multi-lateral agreement signed between  
      Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE has existed in the basin since  
      1978. Although the agreement has provided the assessment of civil liabilities and compensation for   
      damage from the pollution of the environment, this agreement has not been effectively 
      implemented in the basin. See Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and   
      Cooperation in International River Basins (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press,  
      1999) p. 128.  
11 
Figure 1.  The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers20  
 
B. HISTORY OF WATER USE IN THE BASIN 
1.      Ancient Mesopotamia  
 
The Euphrates and Tigris rivers have constituted a lifeline for human beings in the 
Middle East since the Sumerians established the first civilization around them in 3500 
BC.21 Successive civilizations have had different  engineering approaches for managing 
the water resources in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. These civilizations were primarily 
concerned with augmenting supplies and satisfying water demands rather than the 
demand management itself.  
                                                 
20 Greg Shapland, Rivers of Discord: International Water Disputes in the Middle East (New York: St.  
      Martin’s Press, 1997) p. 100.  
21 Michael Schulz, “Turkey, Syria, and Iraq: A Hydropolitical Security Complex” in Leif Ohlsson  
      (ed.), Hydropolitics (London: Zed Books, 1995) p. 91 
12 
As the first civilizations in Mesopotamia, the Sumerians, Babylonians, and 
Assyrians sustained an economy primarily based on agriculture. Since water is  
indispensable for agriculture, these socities established complex irrigation networks and 
organized institutions in order to use water resources efficiently. They developed large-
scale infrastructures for flood control and built barrages to regulate the flow of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers. These civilizations also used the Euphrates and Tigris rivers 
for the purposes of navigation, transportation, and urban development.22 The importance 
of water for these early civilizations and their efforts for maintaining an efficient water 
management system in the Mesopotamia was reflected in the Code of Hammurabi, which 
is accepted as the first written laws that regulated the use of water in the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin. 
The peoples who successively conquered Mesopotamia enriched the 
Mesopotamian culture as they introduced their traditional beliefs, practices, and customs. 
However, because of environmental conditions peculiar to Mesopotamia and the 
existence of an already complex civilization there, these newcomers eventually adopted 
the indigenous culture, enhanced the inherited technical achievements in irrigation and 
agriculture, and advanced the social and civil institutions proper to a hydraulic 
civilization.23 As new ways of managing and controlling the natural forces of water were 
found, civilizations moved further away from the natural course of water resources. 
Nevertheless, the social, economic, and political structure of these agrarian civilizations 
and their development relied upon a well-developed and well-maintained hydro- 
agricultural system.     
The Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century destroyed much of these irrigation 
systems along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. In the following centuries, since the 
system was rendered useless by neglect and by the breakdown of central government 
administrations, Mesopotamia declined in terms of prosperity and political importance. 
                                                 
22 Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S. Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context for Conflict 
      or Co-operation? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) p. 121      
23  Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim S. Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context for Conflict 
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However, during the Ottoman Empire, the hydraulic system was partially repaired and 
relative prosperity returned to the region. With the decline of the Ottomans, many 
irrigation installations again fell into ruin.24  
2.      Modern Mesopotamia  
 
Historically, the Euphrates-Tigris basin was mostly administered by a unitary 
authority under different empires and colonizers that had ruled  Mesopotamia. From the 
sixteenth century to the end of World War I, the region was under the Ottoman rule. In 
the early twentieth century subsequent to the World War I, this long- lasting Ottoman rule 
came to an end and the geopolitical map of the entire Middle East dramatically changed. 
Following the Sévres Treaty in 1920, which was signed between the defeated Ottoman 
Empire and the Allied Powers of Britain and France, the Euphrates-Tigris basin was 
divided among three parties: Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Turkey, the new independent 
Turkish State established in 1920 on the lands of Anatolia, became the upper riparian of 
the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Syria and Iraq, which were under French and British 
mandates respectively from 1920 until their independence  (Iraq in 1932 and Syria in 
1946) emerged as the lower riparian states in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. As a 
consequence of this partition of the Middle East, the treaties concluded after World War 
I, for the first time in the history of Mesopotamia, hydropolitics became an international 
issue and the water disputes acquired a nationalistic character.  
            a.        The First Phase (1900-60) 
            A basic effort in managing the water resources of the Euphrates and Tigris 
Rivers in the early twentieth century focused on engineering facilities, which were 
undertaken in downstream areas to control the flow of the rivers. The first of these 
facilities was the construction of the Hindiya Barrage on the Euphrates near Babylon in 
Iraq between the years 1911 and 1914. The Ottoman Empire built this barrage in 
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accordance with the suggestions of a British hydrological engineer named William 
Wilcox.25  
           Between 1900-1960, no signs of a water conflict arose in the basin. 
Furthermore, some protocols and treaties among the three riparian states about basic 
rights in the use of the two rivers occured. The first treaty was the Franco-British 
Convention of 1920. According to this agreement, the mandatory powers agreed to 
establish a committee to examine and to coordinate the use of the water  of the Euphrates 
and Tigris rivers. The second agreement, which was about the use of the Koveik River26 
and the possible use of the Euphrates River, was signed between France and Turkey in 
October 1920. Two more agreements were signed between Turkey and France in May 
1926 and in May 1930, both of which commited the two parties to coordinate their plans 
to use the Euphrates River.27 
            In the early 1940s, the water issue was considered a technical and 
engineering problem,  which required the collaboration between the upstream and the 
downstream countries. This was apparent in the cooperation between Turkey and Iraq. 
The two countries exchanged information on flood prevention for both the Euphrates and 
the Tigris rivers. Since the Euphrates and Tigris rivers have extreme seasonal and annual 
variance in their flows, both countries agreed to implement water storage measurements 
in upstream areas in order to manage the water in the basin optimally. In March of 1946, 
the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborly Relations was signed between Turkey and 
Iraq.  
                                                 
25 Naff Thomas, Water Issue in Iraq, (Philadelphia: Associates For Middle East Research, 1991) p.  
      127.  
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27 Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River   
     Basins (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999) p. 124.  
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In compliance with this treaty, both sides agreed to share data relevant to the Euphrates 
and Tigris Rivers.28  
           Within the framework of these treaties, Iraq was the first of the three 
countries that sought ways of developing the waters of the two rivers. While under the 
British mandate, the Department of Irrigation was already established in Iraq. Then a 
program for hydrological data collection and designing of irrigation projects was 
initiated. After the British mandate, in the 1950s, Iraq’s efforts to  use the waters of the 
Euphrates-Tigris basin continued efficiently by establishing  the Board of Development, 
the Ministry of Development, and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. With the help of 
foreign firms, a second barrage that purposed to divert the floodwaters of the Euphrates 
River was constructed near the city of Ramadi in Iraq.29 All these reforms helped Iraq 
restore the already existent irrigation network in the lands of Mesopotamia, yet many of 
these national and regional programs were disrupted in 1958, when a leftist pan-Arab 
army coup established a republic in Iraq, orinenting its foreign policy toward the Soviet 
Union.30 
           Syria began to exploite the Euphrates River in the 1950s. With the 
introduction of motorized pumps after the Second World War, Syria’s irrigated 
agriculture developed rapidly. The irrigated area increased from 295, 000 hectares of land 
in 1945 to 657, 000 hectares of land in 1960. Despite these developments, the amount of 
the water that Syria was extracting from the Euphrates was rather small. According to 
Syrian official sources, Syria was using only between 2.5 to 3 billion cubic meters of the 
Euphrates water in the 1950s.31 Parallel to further expansion of irrigated agriculture, this 
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amount of water increased in the following decades with the construction of large-scale 
irrigation networks and massive land reclamation projects. 
Water resource studies were initiated in Turkey in the early 1930s, and the 
need for electric energy emerged as the most urgent priority when the country embarked 
upon an ambitious economic and agricultural development program. To meet the energy 
needs of the young republic, the Electric Works Studies Agency (T.E.K., a Turkish 
acronym) was established in 1936. One of the essential objectives of this agency was to 
produce electric energy from national  water resources that had not been exploited. After 
assessing the energy potential of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, the agency initiated 
intensive studies and built observation stations to examine the aspects of  both rivers. In 
the following years, topographical and hydrological surveys were conducted and 
hydrometric stations were established on the Euphrates River in 1936 and on the Tigris 
River in 1947. Then in 1954, the State Hydraulic Works Agency (D.S.I., a Turkish 
acronym) was established when new requirements emerged.32 Based on studies covering 
the basins in Turkey, the DSI divided Turkey into 26 basins and launched studies and 
planning activities. Reconnaissance studies were completed in 1958, and the initial plans 
were developed for three dams on the lower Euphrates and five dams on the Tigris. 
Though the governments periodically attempted to secure funds for the development 
projects in the Euphrates-Tigris basin, in the face of more pressing economic priorities 
the idea of developing these two rivers did not become politically viable until the 
1960s.33  
                         b.The Second Phase (1960 -Present)    
                        The management of the water resources was not a problem in the 
Euphrates-Tigris basin in the first half of the century; however, some disputes arose 
                                                 
32 Olcay Unver and Bruno Voron, “The Southeastern Anatolia Project-GAP” Water International 18  
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among the three riparian states in the 1960s when each country began to implement its 
own development projects on the portions of the rivers in its own territory.   
The reasons for the failure of comprehensive water management in the 
basin and the emergence of a conflict among the riparian states will be discussed in detail 
in the following chapter. At this point, only the initial efforts of the riparian states will be 
presented without discussing the political rationales behind them.  
           By the mid-1960s, the development of irrigated agriculture in Iraq far 
surpassed the development in Syria and Turkey. During this period, Iraq was irrigating 
over five times as much land as Syria and nearly ten times as much as Turkey.34 To 
continue its efforts to use the water of these rivers efficiently, Iraq began constructing the 
“Third River”35 between the Euphrates and Tigris in the 1960s. This was a 565 km long 
canal, which would run from near Baghdad to Basra connecting the two rivers. Although 
in the coming decades the Iraqi regime  used this canal for political purposes, the initial 
purpose of the canal was to provide irrigation water for the land between the Euphrates 
and the Tigris Rivers. 
            In the late 1970s, as part of the effort to prevent flood damage, Iraq built 
another canal to divert excess water from the Tigris into the Lake Thartar. Since then Iraq 
has continually built other similar canals linking Lake Thartar to the Euphrates and again 
connecting the lake with the Tigris further downstream. Even though these canals were 
dug with the primary aim of flood control, they also allowed the Iraqis to transfer the 
water from one river to compensate for low flow in the other. In addition to using the 
rivers for irrigation purposes by means of these canals, Iraq also built barrages on the 
Euphrates and Tigris to produce hydropower. The Haditha Dam was a remarkable project 
built on the Euphrates. This dam was completed in 1985 with a substantial hydropower 
capacity of 660 megawatts.36 In 1990, Iraq started construction of another hydropower 
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dam at Khan al-Baghdadi on the Euphrates, but the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990 brought it to a halt.  
  Syria began exploiting the water of the Euphrates for irrigation and hydro-
power in the early 1960s. Mainly with the help of the Soviet Union, the Tabqa Dam was 
built on the Euphrates in 1973. This major dam was purposed to meet Syria’s water and 
energy needs. The filling of this dam in 1975 became a major source of conflict between 
Syria and Iraq as illustrated  earlier. The Bath Dam, completed in 1986, was the second 
of the following Syrian projects on the Euphrates River. However, the hydropower 
capacity of the Bath Dam was not on the same scale as the Tabqa Dam. The Bath Dam 
had a limited capacity for electric generation and provided relatively little water for 
irrigation. The Tishreen Dam, the third Syrian dam on the Euphrates, is still under 
construction. It was mainly designed for hydropower with a capacity of 1.6 billion 
kilowatt-hours electricity per year. In spite of these ongoing projects on the Euphrates, 
the Syrian ability to use the Tigris River was limited because the river is not wholly 
within the Syrian territory. Since the border with Turkey runs down the middle of the 
river, Syria could not build reservoirs to store or divert the water without the cooperation 
of its neighbor on the other bank. No agreement on this subject has yet been signed and at 
present Syrian farmers take water from the Tigris only in small quantities. 
  Following the prepatory land development on the Euphrates River near 
Keban Strait, Turkey began constructing the Keban Dam on the Euphrates River in the 
mid-1960s and finished the project in 1974. This was the first major dam on the 
Euphrates in Turkey. With a hydropower generating capacity of 1,360 megawatts, the 
Keban Dam was designed to generate almost six  billion kilowatt-hours of electricity per 
year. The second dam on the Euphrates was the Karakaya Dam, which was completed in 
1988. This was the first dam built within the implementation of the Southeastern Anatolia 
Project (GAP, Turkish acronyms). Like the Keban Dam, the purpose of the Karakaya 
Dam was to produce hydropower with the generating capacity of 7.5 kilowatt-hours of 
electricity per year. The third dam on the Euphrates River was the Ataturk Dam, which 
was regarded as the linchpin of the GAP Project. Completed in 1990, the Ataturk Dam 
was a huge engineering feat by any standards. Unlike the Keban and Karakaya Dams, the 
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Ataturk Dam was designed to store water for large-scale irrigation as well as for the 
generation of hydropower. For that reason Syria and Iraq regarded this dam as a more 
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III. THE EMERGENCE OF CONFLICT AND THE   
           PROBLEM OF WATER USE IN THE EUPHRATES-   
           TIGRIS BASIN 
 
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CONFLICT 
The conflicts about the use of the water resources in the Euphrates-Tigris basin 
began in the early 1960s with the large-scale Turkish and Syrian irrigation and 
hydropower projects on the Euphrates, and to a lesser extent on the Tigris River. These 
upperstream facilities caused great anxiety because Iraq was the southernmost riparian 
state and the major user of the rivers in the basin. Iraq perceived these massive projects as 
a menacing strategic challenge to its national security and accused both Turkey and Syria 
of raising their claims on the water in the basin at Iraq’s expense.  
To discuss the possibility dividing the water resources in the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin, the three parties came together for the first time in the mid- 1960s.  For negotiating 
purposes, each country made maximum demands about its share of the water in the basin. 
Iraq wanted 14 billion cubic meters per year, Syria 13 bcm. and Turkey projected a 
demand of 18 bcm. per year. Since the total of these demands was roughly one-and-a-half 
times the average flow of the river,37 no agreement was reached. After this first 
unsuccessful trilateral attempt to share the water of the rivers, Syria and Iraq held some 
bilateral meetings to  allocate the waters of the Euphrates between them. In these talks, 
Iraq wanted a fixed amount of the river’s flow, arguing that it was entitled to the amount 
of the water that it had always received. Since then, this “acquired rights” issue has 
become the major Iraqi argument in all the negotiations regarding the Euphrates and 
Tigris basin. In response to these Iraqi claims, Syria wanted a balanced allocation of the 
Euphrates water between the two countries basing its arguments on potential needs rather 
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than past use in the basin. The two countries came close to agreeing on the issue, but in 
the end no agreement was signed between them.  
Iraqi protests against the Turkish and Syrian projects continued through  the late 
1960s. As a reflection of this opposition, Iraq objected to Turkey’s application for 
financing from the World Bank for its Keban Dam. The World Bank accepted Turkey’s 
request but insisted on a guarantee that Turkey would maintain a flow of at least 450 
cubic meters per second through the dam.38  
Meanwhile, the relations between Iraq and Syria also became problematic. The 
main reason for this growing antagonism between Syria and Iraq was the rivalry between 
the Baathist regimes in Baghdad and Damascus. In the 1970s, the two regimes were 
competitors for influence in the Arab world. They were trying to represent the Arab front 
separately and trying to dominate each other in the region. The Syrian completion of the 
Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates in 1973 was the aggravating factor in this already existent 
hostility. With the completion of  the Tabqa Dam, Syria slowed the flow of water of the 
Euphrates toward Iraq. According to Baghdad, this caused havoc in the Iraqi part of the 
basin and Iraq directed its protests against Syria rather than against Turkey. This change 
in the direction of the Iraqi opposition from Turkey to Syria was interpreted as Iraq’s 
realization that the Turkish project would not result in any substantial loss of water for 
downstream riparians and would indeed benefit Iraq by bringing about a more regular 
flow. In contrast, the Syrian project of the Tabqa Dam on the Euphrates would supply 
large quantities of water for irrigation in Syria and hence would reduce the flow of the 
river in Iraq.39  
1.       The First Crisis 
The tension further increased between Iraq and Syria when Syria began to fill the 
reservoirs of the Tabqa Dam in 1975. In early 1975, Iraq complained that Syria had 
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caused great economic damage to Iraq by reducing the flow of the Euphrates River from 
15.3 billions cubic meters to 9.4 billions cubic meters. Iraq wanted Syria to give its 
“established rights of 16.1 billions cubic meters per year”40 in the basin and claimed that 
Syria deliberately impounded more water in Lake Assad—the name of the reservoirs for 
the Tabqa Dam—than it could use to generate electricity and to irrigate farmlands. Syria 
did not accept these Iraqi accusations and argued that it had the right to use 13 billion 
cubic meters water per year from the Euphrates since its water resources were extremely 
limited when compared to Iraq. The disputes between the two countries turned into a 
crisis, and Iraq threatened to bomb the Tabqa Dam in Syria. With the escalation of the 
tension, the two Baathist regimes traded other accusations unrelated to the water issue, 
and Syria began to support the Iraqi Kurdish dissidents openly. Then the two countries 
sent troops to their borders in April 1975.41 Through the mediation of Saudi Arabia and 
the former Soviet Union, the crisis was solved before an armed conflict between the two 
states ensued. Following the efforts of Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union to reconcile the 
differences between Syria and Iraq, Syria agreed to release additional water for Iraq on 
the Euphrates. It was not made public, but according to the agreement, Syria would keep 
40% of the water and would allow 60% to pass through to Iraq. 42 
2.        The Joint Technical Committee and Trilateral Talks  
In 1980, Turkey and Iraq established the Joint Technical Committee to continue 
the efforts to reach a solution that would satisfy the needs of the riparian states in the 
basin. Syria entered this group in 1983, and this tripartite committee began its work on 
the basis of exchanging information about the two rivers. However, with the initiation of 
Turkey’s GAP Project in the mid-1980s, the growing uneasiness on the part of both Syria 
and Iraq that the likely water demands of the GAP Project could threaten them 
economically and strategically hindered this committee’s goals. Turkey declared itself 
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ready to discuss its plans for establishing the principles of using the two cross-border 
rivers. But Syria and Iraq were not satisfied with this Turkish approach, and the two Arab 
states felt that their interests would be better served by an agreement that would give 
them a fixed volume of water. Under these circumstances, the Joint Technical Committee 
held sixteen technical and two ministerial meetings but the talks among the three riparian 
states have reached a deadlock. In fact,  the parties even failed to produce an outline that 
might serve as a basic report about the use of the two rivers. However, bilateral talks 
continued among the riparian states and further initiatives were suggested by the 
respective countries to solve the problem of water use in the basin.    
3.   Water Issue and Syrian Support for the PKK  
In the 1980s, the GAP project pitted the two Arab states against Turkey in its 
early stages, but the hostility between the two Arab regimes and Syr ian support for Iran 
in the war against Iraq decreased the possibility of an alliance between Iraq and Syria 
against Turkey. This hostility also shaped Turkey’s relations with its downstream 
neighbors on a bilateral basis. As a result of Iraq’s pre-occupation with its war against 
Iran, Syria has played a more dominant role in the disputes with Turkey over the use of 
the Euphrates River. This Syrian role was further heightened in 1984 with the emergence 
of the PKK, a terrorist group that has used violence to create an independent Kurdish 
state in the southeastern parts of Turkey. Turkey initiated the GAP project not only to 
meet its increasing hydroelectrical demands, but also as an integrated regional 
development program to reduce the uneasiness of the citizens living in the region. 
Therefore, the PKK  attacked the GAP facilities and GAP infrastructure when it was 
under construction. These geographical and political connections between the terrorist 
activities of the PKK and the GAP project became inescapably connected when Syria 
began to support the PKK attacks in southeastern Turkey. Since then, Syria has used its 
support for the PKK as a bargaining chip in its disputes with Turkey over the Euphrates 
River, hoping to induce Turkey to release additional waters toward Syria. At every 
opportunity, though Turkey unequivocally declared that it would not use its 
transboundary waters for political purposes, Syria has continued to support the PKK 
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activities, and the Syrian goverment has failed to restrain the PKK from operating within 
its territory. 
Therefore, high- level meetings between Turkey and Syria have focused on  Syria 
supporting the PKK and the volume of the water which Turkey would allow to flow 
down the Euphrates River into Syria. In 1987, the two countries signed the Protocol of 
Economic Cooperation, which included a Turkish guarantee for a minimum flow of 500 
cubic meters per second in return for Syria’s cooperation on “border security.”43 This 
amount was well within the range that Syria demanded in the early negotiations. On two 
occasions in 1993 and 1994, the Turkish authorities repeatedly confirmed its commitment 
in the most recent negotiations concerning the Euphrates River basin. Relations between 
the two countries improved somewhat after Syria extradited Abdullah Ocalan, the leader 
of the PKK, from Syria in 1998; however, the underlying tensions about the water issue 
have not completely disappeared.    
4.      The Ataturk Dam and the Second Crisis  
In the late 1980s, Syrian and Iraqi fears continued about Turkey's use of the 
Euphrates waters assuming that this would disrupt both their current consumption 
patterns and future development plans. Because of this growing anxiety in Syria and Iraq 
about Turkey’s GAP project, the dam building facilities within the implementation of the 
GAP project created great consternation among the downstream neighbors even before it 
adversely affected them. Within this atmosphere, the Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates 
River caused much controversy between Turkey and the two Arab states. The Ataturk 
Dam was the largest of the 22 dams proposed for the Southeastern Anatolia Project. 
Different from the previous dams—Keban and Karakaya—the Ataturk Dam would 
generate hydropower energy and would maintain fresh water for irrigating farmlands.  
After the first crisis between Syria and Iraq in 1975, a second crisis occurred 
when Turkey finished the Ataturk Dam in 1990 a seven-year period after its initiation in 
1983. This interrupted the flow of the Euphrates for a month, partly to fill the reservoir. 
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Despite an advanced warning from Turkey, and despite and increase in the water supply 
before and after the cutoff,44 high tension ensued over the downstream riparians. Syria 
and Iraq both protested that Turkey now possessed a water weapon that could be used 
against them. Syria was already desperately short of water, and much of the water for its 
towns, industries, and farms comes from the Euphrates. Beyond this dependence, the 
country has been chronically vulnerable to drought. Furthermore, Syria's population 
growth rate, at 3.7 percent per year, is one of the highest in the world, constantly adding 
to the scale of Syria's demand for water. Turkey and Syria have exchanged angry threats 
over this situation. Moreover, despite a treaty that Syria signed in 1987 about not 
supporting the PKK activities in Turkey, Syria has increasingly continued giving 
sanctuary to the PKK guerilla separatists.  
Interesrtingly, the Ataturk Dam crisis caused an unprecedented degree of Syrian-
Iraqi unity over the Euphrates. These governments have long held each other in mutual 
contempt because of their respective regimes. As a result, they see the enemy of the other 
as their own close ally. Yet somehow, they have managed to take a common stand 
against Turkey. Thus a mutual enemy has allowed them to establish a common bond 
between the nations. On 16 April 1990, at the Secretariat of the Arab League which was 
then located in Tunis, the two states signed an agreement that allocated the waters of the 
Euphrates on a percentage basis. According to this agreement, whatever the volume of 
the river that crossed the Turkish-Syrian border was, Syria would keep 42% of the water 
for itself and would allow 58% percent of that quantity to cross its border to Iraq. At the 
same time, the two Arab states jointly approached Turkey to demand a trilateral 
agreement that would permanently divide the waters of the Euphrates River. The 
agreement of April 1990 appears to remain in force. Neither Syria or Iraq has violated the 
agreement, and Iraq has not complained that Syria is not honoring the agreement. But the 
united front against Turkey, very short- lived,  finally collapsed when Syria opposed the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.   
5.        Birecik Dam Crisis and the Recent Situation 
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In 1995, a new crisis over water supplies developed between Turkey and Syria 
after the credit agreement for the new Birecik Dam on the Euphrates River was reached. 
The Birecik Dam would be located between the Ataturk Dam and the Syrian border and it 
would generate power and provide water for the irrigation of 70,000 hectares of 
farmlands in the southeastern region of Turkey. After the approval of credit for the dam 
project, Syria immediately lobbied against Turkey both in the Arab League and in the 
Western countries. At the same time, signs of revival of the Syrian-Iraqi unity on the 
Euphrates also reappeared.45 Despite their deep political oppositions, officials from Syria 
and Iraq agreed on the assumption that Ankara’s predominant control over the Euphrates 
and Tigris rivers posed a threat to their political and economic future. Based on this 
argument, along with other Arab countries, Syria and Iraq issued the Damascus 
Declaration, accusing Turkey of releasing contaminated water downstream to Syria. 
Turkey did not take these accusations seriously and reiterated its readiness to discuss all 
aspects of its projects on the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers.     
In September 1998, another crisis occurred between Turkey and Syria as a result 
of the continuing Syrian sanctuary for the PKK. This time, Turkish leaders adopted a 
harsher tone toward Syria and warned Damascus to stop supporting the PKK. Turkey also 
demanded the extradition of Abdullah Ocalan from his villa in Damascus. Ten thousand 
Turkish troops advanced to the Syrian border and the Turkish air force was placed on red 
alert. Through the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarek’s mediation efforts between 
Ankara and Damascus, the two countries reached an agreement. Unlike the previous 
talks, the water issue was not mentioned, and Syria promised once more to honor its 
commitments to end its support of the PKK.           
 
B.        THE PROBLEM OF WATER USE IN THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS   
            BASIN 
The joint dependency of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq on the Euphrates and Tigris  
rivers has caused the above-mentioned conflicts. Hydropolitics has shaped their relations 
                                                 
45 Syrian support for the Allied Forces in the Gulf War spoiled the previous unity between Syria and  
     Iraq against Turkey over the water issue. 
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over the last three decades. As a result of the ongoing negotiations  on either trilateral or 
bilateral basis, “management, apportionment, and development planning” on the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers have emerged as the primary controversy among the three 
riparian states. 
 Several reasons make the management of fresh water resources so critical in the 
Euphrates-Tigris basin. First of all, the sensitivity of the water problem in this 
hydropolitical complex stems from the fact that none of these countries has enough water 
resources to meet its needs. Out of these three riparian states, Turkey is erroneously 
viewed as possessing vast water resources. But contrary to this prevailing belief, Turkey 
is not a water-rich country. Still, some provinces in parts of southeastern Turkey are 
suffering from a general shortage of water.46 This false image of Turkey is created 
because Turkey is presently using only 25.9 billion cubic meters of its capacity of 110 
billion cubic meters of fresh water. The remaining portion of 84.1 billion cubic meters is 
not what Turkey is not in need of, but this remaining portion is the part of fresh water 
resources which cannot yet be allocated to its needs. According to research conducted by 
the World Bank, countries regarded as rich in water resources have eight to ten thousand 
cubic meters of water per capita annually. As can be seen in Table 1, the per capita water 
quantities of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq are well below this amount.  
What make this situation even worse are the high growth of the populations of the 
riparian states.  In the face of increasing populations and as a corollary decreasing water 
consumptions per capita in the region, the access to water resources has become of vital 
importance for the riparian states. For instance, in 1990, Turkey had a population of 56.5 
million, with an annual average growth rate of 2.2 percent. This figure is estimated to 
exceed 90 million by the year 2010.47 Meanwhile, the populations of Syria and Iraq are 
also growing rapidly, implying increased water requirements. For the future, the 
downstream states of Syria and Iraq are even becoming more dependent on the waters of 
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the two rivers as an alternative to insufficient rainfall in the region.  With this estimated 
population growth, Syria and Iraq in particular will soon reach a critical level of water 
scarcity. This will further complicate the problems of water management in the basin.48        
 
Table 1. Water Quantities Per Capita in Some Water-Rich and Middle Eastern 







10, 000 8, 000 
Iraq    2,110     950 
Turkey    1,830     980 
Syria     1,420     780 
Israel       300     150 
Jordan       250       90 
Palestine        100          40 
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49 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Water: A Source of Conflict and Cooperation in    
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The ambiguity about the projected water demands of each riparian state over the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers presents another area of dispute. This ambiguity further 
aggravates the situation in terms of water management and development planning in the 
basin. Different from the Jordan River Basin, which is another area of water conflict in 
the Middle East, the water resources of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are not scarce. 
Under the conditions of normal and anticipated use, the Euphrates and Tigris are 
estimated to meet the demands of the riparian states for the coming years.50 What makes 
the issue a problematic one are the water demands of each country which have been put 
forward without a good evaluation of their contribution to the rivers and their present and 
future plans they will use to manage the waters of these two rivers. Since each country 
perceives the use of water resources in the basin as directly linked to their national 
securities and each recognizes the issue of access to water resources as one of the most 
important means of power in the region, each worries about the relative gains of the 
others and then attempts to prevent any possible increase in the share of the other 
riparians without considering the strategic consequences of these policies in the basin.   
As shown in Table 2, while 88.7 percent of the total water potential of the 
Euphrates Basin originates in Turkey, Syria contributes only 11.3%. Iraq’s contribution 
to the runoff is nil. While contribution of these two downstream countries to the water 
potential of the Euphrates River is at such a modest percentage, Syria and Iraq have been 
demanding 22% and 43% respectively out of this potential. Since the two Arab states 
have not yet made their projects, on which they base their claims over the Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers, available to the interested parties outside the Arab world, they have not 
provided enough evidence to support such high demands from the two rivers.51 
Meanwhile, Turkey, as the upperstream state in the basin envisages using only 35% of 
the total flow, which is quite reasonable compared to its contribution of 88.7%. Turkey 
also continually reiterates its readiness to discuss all aspects of its projects on the 
Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. 
                                                 
50 Frederick M. Lorenz and Edward J. Erickson, The Euphrates Triangle: Security Implications of the  
      Southeastern Anatolia Project  (Washington: National Defense University, 1999) p. 46.  
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Another important point in Table 2 is that the total amount of water planned to be 
used by the riparian countries exceeds the total flow capacity of the Euphrates River by 
17.3 billion cubic meters. Obviously, it is impossible to meet such demands as far as the 
river’s potential is concerned. When this matter was brought to the attention of the 
riparian states, each riparian country proposed different solutions for the water deficit it 
faced if the all projected water demands in the basin were implemented. Turkey has 
suggested that the quantity of water each state demanded for irrigation and other purposes 
should be determined by applying identical criteria to all three countries. This idea did 
not suit Syria and Iraq’s interests. They argued that the amount of water lacking must be 
deducted proportionally from each country’s demand and each country must be free to 
choose the criteria it will use to determine its own water needs.  
Table 2. Water Potential of the Euphrates River and the Consumption Targets of   
               the Riparian  States in the Basin (in billion cubic meters per year)52 
 
Countries Contribution Consumption Targets 
Turkey 31.58  (88,70%) 18.42 (35,00%) 
Syria   4.00  (11,50%) 11.30 (22,00%)  
Iraq   0.00  (0,00%) 23.00 (43,00%) 
Total 35.58  (100.00%) 52.92 (100,00%) 
 
Turkey presented another solution in order to alleviate the water shortage in the 
Euphrates basin. This Turkish solution was transferring an amount of water from the 
Tigris River to the Euphrates on the condition that this decrease would not destroy the 
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water balance in the Tigris basin. Unfortunately, Iraq rejected this proposition, since it 
has been using the entire annual capacity of 48 billion cubic me ters of this river. As in the 
case with the Euphrates Basin, the amount of water planned to be used by the three 
riparian countries of the Tigris River exceeds the river’s total capacity by 5.8 billion 
cubic meters. As can be seen in Table 3, Turkey and Iraq share the total water potential of 
the basin. Their contributions are 51.9% and 48.% respectively. Again the consumption 
targets Syria and Iraq advanced are much higher than the potential amount of water that 
can originate in their lands. Turkey, on the  other hand, plans to use a relatively small 
portion of the waters eminating from its own territory.       
Table 3. Water Potential of the Tigris River and the Consumption Targets of the   
               Riparian States in the Basin (in billion cubic meters per year)53 
 
Countries Contribution  Consumption Targets 
Turkey 25.24 (51,80%) 6.87 (13,00%) 
Syria   0.00  (0,00%) 2.60 (4,00%)  
Iraq  23.43 (48,10%)           45.00 (83,00%) 
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V.  DOMESTIC CONCERNS OF TURKEY AND THE GAP 
PROJECT 
 
 The Euphrates and Tigris rivers present a complex web of relations for Turkey, 
Syria, and Iraq, nations that geographically are shared owners and users of the two rivers. 
Within this web of relations, (See Figure 1), the riparian states are strategically positioned 
between two main areas of concern, one of which is the domestic politics of each 
country, and the other is the international negotiations among them which in turn cause 
new paradoxes in the basin.54  The respective domestic politics of the riparian countries 
form a vertical set of relations that basically dictate the security concerns for each state. 
Meanwhile, the international relations among the three countries represent the horizontal 
level of relations including other issues, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which have deeply impacted the region overall. These domestic 
and external political problems generate hostilities and intertwine the affairs of three 
riparian states complexly. The diplomatic tactics and strategies of each riparian state are 
being constrained by what other states will accept and what their own domestic 
constituencies will ratify. The riparian states are expected to bargain domestically and 
internationally.  
Presently, the similar domestic concerns of each riparian state and the constant 
state behavior that shapes the international relations among the Middle Eastern countries 
make bargaining over the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers even more problematic. The 
strikingly similar domestic concerns of the disputing parties can be described as “the 
security concerns of each state concerning the ethno-religious groups.” These domestic 
political concerns of each riparian state can be highlighted as follows: 
· Turkey’s efforts to increase the living standards in the southeast region of 
the country, which have been heavily inhabited by Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnic 
origin; 
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· Concerns of the Syrian government, which have been powered by an 
Alawi minority, to subjugate the Sunni-Muslims in the country to sustain their loyalty to 
the regime; 
· Saddam’s domination of Shi’ite Arabs and Sunni Kurds to consolidate his 
regime and to increase the possibilities of his survival. 
Beside these political issues, the three countries are also facing domestic 
economic concerns that make the use of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers imperative. 
The economic interests which urge the riparian states to use the Euphrates and the Tigris 
rivers efficiently can be summarized as: 
· Turkey is poised on the brink of becoming a major regional economic 
power and improving the southeastern Anatolia region by using the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers. This potentially forms an important cornerstone for the continued development of 
Turkey’s agricultural and industrial base and is also a critical consideration for the 
country’s increasing energy demands.   
· Syria has an agriculture-based economy, heavily dependent on the waters 
of the Euphrates River. The direct link among water, food, and economic expansion is of 
pivotal importance for the Ba’thist regime in the face of a growing population and the 
high rate of unemployment. 
· Economically, Iraq has been a relatively deprived state over the last two 
decades because of its eight-year war with Iran and then its invasion of Kuwait, which 
resulted in the Gulf War. Furthermore, Iraq’s economy depends on oil revenues, which 
the U.N. sanctions in the aftermath of the Gulf War have strained immensely. Agriculture 
has declined and the need for water has increased dramatically.      
After these general overviews of the political and economic concerns of the 
riparian states regarding their need for the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, the following 
sections will analyze the domestic concerns of Turkey in detail and elaborate on the 
Turkish imperatives for harnessing the waters of the two rivers.  
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A.  TURKEY’S WATER RESOURCES  
Fresh water resources in Turkey are far from being abundant. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Turkey has only about a five or six percent of the water available in the 
water-rich regions and most of these resources are unevenly distributed and under-used.55 
There are a total of 26 major hydrologic basins in Turkey. Twenty two of these basins are 
river basins and the remaining four are enclosed basins that have no flow to the sea. As 
can be seen in Table 4, the first two river basins, the Euphrates and the Tigris, contain the 
largest volume of flow among the rivers of Turkey. These two rivers comprise nearly 
one-third of the nation's total surface flow: 17 percent from the Euphrates and 11.5 
percent from the Tigris.  
Turkey’s average annual rainfall, which is an important factor in maintaining the 
flow of the fresh water resources, is 643 mm. About 186 billion cubic meters of this 
amount end up as surface runoff, 274 billion cubic meters are lost in transpiration and 
another 69 billion cubic meters of precipitated water feed the underground water aquifers. 
Another 28 billion cubic meters of the aquifers return to the surface via springs and join 
the rivers. In addition, 7 billion cubic meters of water comes from neighboring countries. 
Totally, Turkey's renewable surface water potential is 193 billion cubic meters. (See 
Table 5.)  Naturally, harnessing the entire potential of 193 billion cubic meters is 
impossible because of technological, topographic, and geologic constraints. Of Turkey's 
surface-water runoff, an estimated 95 billion cubic meters per year cannot be used 
beneficially, but 98 billion cubic meters can be used; 95 billion cubic meters of this 
amount come from internally originated surface water while 3 billion cubic meters come 
from transboundary waters that originate in neighboring countries and then flow through 
Turkey. In addition, 12 billion cubic meters of renewable water comes from underground. 
With this amount, Turkey’s total renewable water potential becomes 205 billion cubic 
meters a year, but only 110 billion cubic meters of this amount can be used 
economically.56 
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One of the factors that makes the availability of fresh water resources a critical 
issue in Turkey is volatile weather conditions and the amount of precipitation. In Turkey, 
the weather changes greatly from region to region. Rain during all four season is only 
common in northern Turkey. In the Mediterranean region the weather is mild and rainy in 
the winter, but dry and very hot in the summer. In the mid-sections of central, eastern and 
southeastern Anatolia, which constitute a large portion of Turkey, the weather is usually 
drier than in other regions. The weather in these regions is very hot and dry in the 
summer, with relatively less precipitation in the winter. For instance, in Ankara, the 
capital of Turkey, located in central Anatolia, there is a significant water shortage, 
especially for agricultural activities, from April until the first week of October.57  
 
Table 4. Turkey’s Annual Average Potential by Basin58  
 
BASIN Average Annual Flow Contribution to Total 
Firat (Euphrates)  31.61  17.0 
Dicle (Tigris)  21.33  11.5 
Dogu Karadeniz  14.90    8.0 
Dogu Akdeniz  11.07    6.0 
Antalya  11.06    5.9 
Bati Karadeniz    9.93    5.3 
Bati Akdeniz    8.93    4.8 
Marmara    8.33    4.5 
Seyhan    8.01    4.3 
Ceyhan   7.18   3.9 
Kizilirmak           6.48   3.5 
Sakarya    6.40   3.4 
Coruh    6.30   3.4 
Yesilirmak    5.80   3.1 
Susurluk     5.43   2.9 
Aras    4.63   2.5 
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Konya    4.52   2.4 
Buyuk Menderes     3.03   1.6 
Vangolu    2.39   1.3 
Kuzey Ege     2.09   1.1 
Gediz    1.95   1.1 
Meric    1.33    0.7 
Kucuk Menderes    1.19   0.6 
Asi    1.17    0.6  
Burdur Goller    0.5   0.3 
Akarcay    0.49   0.3 
TOTAL            186.05           100.00 
 
 
As a result of these climatic changes, discrepancies and serious inequalities over 
the amount of precipitation develop. The average annual precipitation of Turkey is 643 
mm, as pointed out, but due to the local seasonal changes, this amount decreases to 
almost 250 mm in some regions and climbs to 3000 mm in other parts of the country. For 
instance, while the provinces in the northern Anatolia average approximately 4,043.3 mm 
precipitation per year, the provinces in the Southeast Anatolia receive only 3.9 mm rain 
during the summer months of June, July, and August, which are the most important 
period for agricultural cultivation. 59 Thus, water shortages emerge as an important 
problem especially for agriculture in the middle and the southeast areas of Anatolia, and 
irrigation becomes an inevitable activity to sustain and to increase productivity in these 
regions. 
With a population of 68 million and a usable water potential of 110 billion cubic 
meters per year, Turkey has an annual amount of water consumption per capita which 
nearly totals nearly 1,830 cubic meters.60 This amount is far below the 10,000 cubic 
meters average in the water-rich regions and puts Turkey into the category of a water- 
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stressed61 country. Even though agriculture accounts for the bulk of water consumption 
in Turkey, nearly 32 cubic kilometers, one of the most serious long-term problems facing 
water planners in Turkey is how to supply enough water resources for the rapidly 
growing urban populations. As a result of the rapid population growth, industrialization 
and the rising living standards, fifty-nine percent of Turkey’s population lives in cities. 
According to the 1990 census, the urban population increased 43% from 1985 to 1990. 
Obviously, the demand for water is growing rapidly in the metropolitan areas of Istanbul, 
Ankara, Izmir, and along the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts as a result of developing 
tourism. Since there are not enough fresh water resources near these regions, these cities 
must be supplied by the rivers farther afield. This requires costly projects which will 
bring additional burdens to the Turkish economy. 62  
In light of the assessments of Turkey’s water resources and the high grow rates of 
population and urbanization, two inescapable consequences emerge: first, it appears 
unrealistic to classify Turkey as a water-rich country, and second, the Euphrates and the 
Tigris Rivers are Turkey’s major water resources, which must be harnessed for the 
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Domestic 643 501 186          95 
Off country - - 7            3 
Underground - - -           12 




B. TURKEY’S DOMESTIC CONCERNS OVER THE WATER ISSUE 
1.      Domestic Political Concerns  
 
The domestic political rationale behind the Turkish water policy and its 
determination about the GAP project has two dimensions that are intrinsically related. 
The first dimension is national security and the integration of the region to the rest of the 
country. The second dimension is the political potential that the region offers parties to 
use the traditional patronage linkages in implementing the project in order to mobilize 
electoral support for the parties in power. These two dimensions represent a varying 
degree of preoccupation with domestic political concerns as opposed to strategic 
international ones. The first dimension is geared toward ensuring a stable and dependable 
domestic constituency base in strategic international interaction, especially with the 
neighboring states. The second dimension focuses more directly on the internal political 
struggle among competing parties. 64 
The first idea about seeing the water issue as a national security concern derives 
from the fact that the southeast region has been one of the nation’s least developed 
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regions. Economic and social differences between this region and the rest of Turkey have 
long existed. For instance, the per capita income in the southeast region accounts for 47 
percent of the per capita income of Turkey as a whole.65 Unsuccessful economic reforms 
in the region mostly due to the remoteness of the region from the commerce centers, its 
harsh landscape and its prevelant climate have caused this backwardness of the southeast 
provinces The backwardness of the region became an emphatic topic of national security 
when the PKK emerged in the early 1980s. The PKK has tried to use the low living 
standards in the region to justify and to impose its separatist goals directed against the 
inhabitants  and the government facilities in the area. Turkish policymakers became more 
concerned with security following the continuing Syrian support for the PKK activities in 
the Turkish provinces. After deliberate calculations, the Turkish government began to 
modify its policy over the use of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers to respond to those 
separatist terrorist activities. The Turkish policy makers also enlarged the scope of the 
GAP project from a hydroelectric and irrigation project to a regional development 
program which will eventually eradicate the regional inequality and promote economic 
growth and social stability in the region. Once the development of the region was 
perceived as the key to eliminating economic disparities with other parts of the country, 
the GAP was considered as the solution to the region's threat to national security and 
integrity. The traditional policy stand of the Turkish state, reflected in strictly hierarchical 
policy initiatives, has slowly shifted. The shift was first to make the state more responsive 
to the region. Secondly, a new partnership between the state, the regional and national 
elites, and local constituencies is designed to develop the region's economic and social 
potential.  
The second dimension of the political rationale behind the GAP project represents 
the old status quo relationships between the state and local constituencies. The electoral 
support can be easily mobilized due to the region's peculiar block mobilized voting 
behavior. During the 1980s and 1990s electoral support has shifted from one party to 
another in blocks in a quite fragmented manner. According to statistics, the number of 
villages where 95 percent of the registered voters cast ballots for one party or 
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independent candidate is quite high in the GAP region. 66  As a result of this highly 
volatile political picture and effective mobilization of local constituencies, the political 
parties cannot afford to ignore the existing political divisions in the region. Given the low 
Gross National Product, population and human development index values, an investment 
in the Southeast is more easily translatable to votes when compared with the other 
regions. That is why all parties are keen to mobilize political support in the region, which 
explains the unquestioned commitment to the GAP. 
2.   Domestic Economic Concerns  
 
Two major domestic economic concerns have shaped the Turkish water policy in 
the basin. The first of these pillars perceives the water resources as a source for irrigation. 
The second concern views the water resources as a means for cheaper and domestically 
produced energy.  
Agricultural development has been a Turkish government priority since the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Despite the rapid industrialization in the 
1980s, agriculture maintains its importance in the overall picture of the Turkish economy. 
Turkey is one of the relatively few countries in the world that is self-sufficient in food 
production and is a leading regional exporter of fruit and vegetables to the Middle East 
and Europe.67 Agriculture accounts for less than 18.5 percent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) and provides more than 50 percent of the nation’s employment. 
Agricultural products comprise most of the raw materials for industry and 15 percent of 
the exports. The agricultural sector in Turkey became more modernized, and structural 
reforms of the agricultural sector have being implemented during the last two decades. 
Together with these developments, the importance of agricultural irrigation increased. 
The importance of irrigational water derives from the fact that Turkish agriculture, 
especially cereal production, is heavily dependent on seasonal rainfall. While there are 
about 8.5 million hectares of land under potential perennial irrigation, only about half of 
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this area, 4.5 million hectares, has been equipped with requisite irrigation infrastructure.68 
Since the expansion of irrigated lands helps improve production, creates rural 
employment and alleviates migration from rural to urban areas, successive governments 
maintained fresh water for the agricultural lands with the utmost care. Toward this end, 
the GAP Project was initiated in the 1970s, and the irrigational infrastructure was also 
renewed in other parts of the country.  
Another economic motive in the Turkish water policy has been the attraction of 
hydroelectric energy owing to Turkey’s increasing energy demands. Although Turkey is 
relatively well endowed with energy and mineral resources, the exploitation of these 
natural resources has occurred slowly. As a result of this slow process, Turkey has 
emerged as an energy poor country. In the 1960s, Turkey was importing 50 % of its 
annual energy requirements and 25 % of the electricity production was dependent on 
imported fuel. The demand for electricity began to exceed supply and by the late 1970s 
the power gap began to constrain industry. The combined demands of industrialization 
and urbanization nearly tripled energy consumption in the 1980s and Turkey had to 
import electricity from Bulgaria and the Soviet Union to meet its power needs.69 
The Turkish government has tried a number of strategies to meet these energy 
crises. The petroleum industry is one of the options to alleviate the energy needs of the 
country. In 1983, to accelerate the exploration process, Turkey eased regulations on the 
activities of foreign oil companies within the country and allowed them to export 35 
percent of the production from fields they discovered in the Anatolia mainland and 45 
percent from offshore fields.70 Most of the country’s oil fields, however, are contained in 
small pockets because of the country’s fractured substrata. The exploration and extraction 
proved very difficult and until the mid 1990s no major finds had been reported. 
The coal industry, as a second choice for covering the energy deficit, has followed 
a somewhat similar history.  The idea of using coal and lignite as source of hydrocarbons 
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in thermal plants attracted the policy makers in the early 1970s. Initially, the production 
of hard coal grew rapidly from an average of about 7.9 million tons from 1970 to 1975 to 
more than 31 million tons in 1985.71 But later on, because of the great depth of the 
country’s deposits, the coal production was hampered and Turkey began to import coal 
for use in power plants. In addition to the thermal power plants, the successive Turkish 
governments have also considered the possibility of using nuclear power to produce 
energy. As many as six nuclear generating plants have been planned, but because of the 
high costs and unfamiliar technology of nuclear power production, these efforts did not 
promise quick solutions to the nation’s energy problems. 
Following the failure to cure its chronic energy shortages, Turkey has found itself 
as a petroleum poor country experiencing rapid development and a growing need for 
energy. Given the country’s geographical situation, which has endowed it with rainfall 
and mountain catchment areas and a good hydropower potential, Turkish policy makers 
focused on the hydroelectrical resources with the aim of developing them immediately. In 
this regard, the projects were initiated and dams, hydroelectric power plants, and other 
water related faciliaties were built to produce energy all around the country. The most 
important of these projects is the GAP project on the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers and 
their tributaries. At full development, the total contribution of the GAP project to the 
overall energy potential of the country is estimated to be an annual 27 billion kilo-Watt 
hours of electricity with an installed capacity over 7,500 MW. This annual electricity 
generation corresponds to 22% of the country's economically viable hydropower 
potential of 118 billion kWh.  
By June 15, 1998, the Ataturk and Karakaya dams, the most important elements 
of the GAP, had generated almost 135 billion kWh energy in total. So far the energy 
generated by these two dams equals a monetary value of eight billion US dollars. To put 
this amount in terms of alternative sources, it equals the importation of 33 million tons of 
fuel oil or 25.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas.72 This production of hydroelectric 
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energy and the economic returns in this area have spurred the Turkish government to 
implement hydropower projects under all circumstances.  
 
C. THE GAP PROJECT AND ITS VISION 
 
The GAP is a large-scale, multi-sectoral regional development project with major 
implications for the region. It is one of the largest river basin development projects in the 
world and the largest of its kind ever undertaken by Turkey. The idea for the project 
began around 1963 as part of the regular five-year national development planning, but the 
actual planning for the project began in 1970. In 1977, the government decided to unite 
both projects under the title of the "Southeast Anatolia Project." In 1986 The State 
Planning Organization was authorized to integrate the Southeast Anatolia Region with 
regional planning and to ensure coordination and steering of continuing activities.73    
The GAP project consists of 13 major irrigation and hydropower plans on both 
the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, seven in the lower Euphrates sub-basin and six in the 
Tigris sub-basin. The project was intended to be implemented in the southeast region of 
Turkey covering nine Turkish provinces. The project area is about 75, 358 square 
kilometers that includes 41 percent of the total watershed of the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers within Turkey, and corresponds to about 9.7 percent of the country’s total area. 
The area has approximately 6.2 million inhabitants, nearly ten percent of Turkey’s 
population.74 The project envisages the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric 
power plants on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and their tributaries. A full development, 
over 1.7 million hectares (6,600 miles) of land will be irrigated and 27 billion kilowatt-
hours of electricity will be generated annually with an installed capacity of over 7,500 
mega-watts. The area to be irrigated accounts for 19% of the economically irrigable area 
in Turkey (8.5 million hectares), and the annual electricity generation accounts for 22% 
of the country's economically viable hydropower potential (118 billion kilowatt-hours). 
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When completed, twenty-two dams, nineteen hydropower plants, and many irrigation 
projects are expected to make the area one of the leading economic regions in Turkey.75 
From the beginning, the project was planned by the State Hydraulic Works 
primarily for irrigation and hydropower generation. But later, in the mid 1980s, with the 
increasing uneasiness of the population living in the region, the Turkish government 
transformed the GAP from a hydroelectric and irrigation project to a comprehensive 
regional development program, including plans for developing agriculture, industry, 
social infrastructure, transportation, education, and health. This new policy aims not only 
to use the water resources better, but to also address the fundamental socio-economic 
inequalities and poverty in the region.  Thus, the modern vision of the GAP project 
transcends than just dams and irrigation ditches. Furthermore, this vision symbolizes 
hope for the future for both the indigenous population of the region and the country as a 
whole.   
1.      Objectives of the GAP Project    
The GAP project has short-term as well as long-term objectives. Some of these 
objectives will not be achieved for another 50 years. When the objectives intended by the 
GAP project are analyzed, it becomes apparent that the project is rich with promises for 
the region and the population. The main objectives of the GAP project as a regional 
development idea are as follows:76  
· To develop all the land and water resources in the region in order to revive 
regional economies;   
· To increase employment by accelerating land development and expanding 
agriculture; 
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· To alleviate the disparity between the Southeastern Anatolia Region and 
other regions by increasing production and welfare levels;      
· To complete the infrastructure projects in major cities to improve the 
quality of life and to attract industry and investment; 
· To organize the economic and physical infrastructure in rural areas by 
using the resources in the most useful ways and to direct urban growth in desired 
directions;  
· To improve education and public health facilities and services; 
· To improve highways from east to west,  and airport development 
· To contribute to the national objectives of sustained economic growth and 
export promotion by using the region’s resources. 
Beyond all of these mid-term and long-term objectives, it is noteworthy that the 
project may eventually improve the social and economic uneasiness of the Turkish 
citizens of the Kurdish ethnic origin living in the region. The persisting armed conflict 
with the Kurdish separatist terrorist organization PKK is commonly related to the 
socioeconomic backwardness of the region. Increased flow of government funding to the 
region and the overall economic development of southeastern Anatolia have increasingly 
become a part of the Turkish government’s policy in order to integrate the region’s 
alienated population. The Turkish government and the people of the southeastern 
Anatolia expect that the prosperity associated with the GAP project will undermine the 
separatist PKK activity.      
With all these objectives to be achieved, the GAP project consumes 6.9 percent of 
the national budget with $1.5 million being spent on the project daily.77 Since the project 
is financed internally without assistance from international financial organizations or the 
World Bank, Turkey must raise much of the funding and naturally this causes difficulties 
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in Turkey’s financial planning. For example, the high rate of inflation that the country 
endures has been attributed to the GAP. Moreover, the delays that the GAP has suffered 
are mainly due to financial constraints. Although the limits on financial support delays 
the completion of the project, this self-sufficiency has led to a heightened sense of 
national pride, a focus on industrializing the nation, significant influence in the region, 
and a great degree of independence in fullfilling the project. 
General disappointments with the GAP project are related with its agricultural and 
irrigation potential. Although 74.3 percent of the total investment in the energy sector 
within GAP had been completed by June 1999, only 12.2 percent of its agricultural 
component was completed. Furthermore, despite attempts for crops diversification, most 
of the increase in agricultural development has actually relied on cotton production. 
Secondly, despite the GAP’s remarkable achievements in popular projects, such as the 
increase in the number of schools, hospitals, and the speed of electrification, the GAP 
project has significantly lagged behind in terms of improving the overall living standards. 
The overall economic structure in the region has remained largely unchanged and the per 
capita income is still about 53 percent the national average. The industrial employment 
accounts for only 5 percent of the total population, well below the national average of 16 
percent. Only five of 15 organized industrial zones and 18 of the small industrial estates 
are active in the region. 78    
 
D.   TURKEY’S REGIONAL WATER POLICY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
Turkey is not a water-rich country and is heavily dependent on the Euphrates and 
the Tigris rivers for the above-mentioned irrigational and hydroelectrical purposes. 
However, Turkey has demonstrated its eagerness to find ways of reaching a basis for 
cooperating with Syria and Iraq to use the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers fairly. Along this 
line, Turkey has conveyed the necessary data pertaining to its planned water strategy on 
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the Euphrates and Tigris to Syria and Iraq during Joint Technical Committee meetings 
which were held among the three countries. The main Turkish argument has been that the 
dependency of the downstream states on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers has not caused 
Turkey to use them irrationally or unreasonably or at the cost of neighboring countries. 
The Turkish government has repeatedly announced that Turkey has never had the 
intention of using its upperstream position as political leverage against the Arab states as 
those countries feared or assumed. Quite to the contrary, these dam-building facilities 
within the GAP project were imperative for Turkey because of its domestic political and 
economic concerns.  
After beginning these projects, Turkey has always sought convincing, sustainable 
formulas to satisfy not only the short-term objectives of the riparian states but also the 
demands of its neighbors in the long run. In this regard, Turkey proposed the “Peace 
Pipeline,” as it is popularly known, in the early 1987. As then visualized, one pipeline 
would carry surplus water from the two Turkish rivers, the Seyhan and the Ceyhan, 
through Syria and Jordan to such faraway places as Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. 
And another pipeline would take water from the Tigris through Iraq and Kuwait to the 
Persian Gulf countries, including the United Arab Emirates. But the Arab states did not 
seriously consider this offer from Turkey because of the mutual distrust among the 
countries through which the pipeline was supposed to pass, and because of the estimated 
high costs of the project.79  
Most Arab states thought that this kind of dependence on Turkey about the water 
issue would increase Turkey’s influence in the region. Yet Turkey is still willing to 
export some of its water to neighboring countries to relieve their shortages. The main 
water resources that can be used for this purpose are in the southern basins of Turkey. 
The Southern basins of Turkey (East Mediterranean, Antalya, West Mediterranean, 
Seyhan and Ceyhan) contribute almost 25 percent of Turkey's total renewable water 
potential. Several dams are operating on these rivers and several others are under 
construction, but some of the water still flows wastefully to the Mediterranean Sea. This 
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water, which flows freely to the sea, can partially alleviate the water shortages in the 
Middle East and Turkey. Several proposals to use the water are under consideration. One 
of the best known projects is the Manavgat Water Supply Project. This project and the 
others proposals have been devised to alleviate water shortages in some parts of Turkey 
and the Middle East.80   
More evidence of Turkish cooperation is Turkey's “Three-Staged Plan.” This plan 
was an effort to reach an accord on water. Turkey has developed this three-stage plan for 
the optimum, equitable, and reasonable use of the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris 
rivers. The history of the Three-Staged Plan goes back to 1960s. It was formulated by 
engineers in the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) of Turkey. Experts have revised and 
improved this plan to conform to the principles designed for the transboundary 
waterways by the International Law Commission of the United Nations. The plan was 
first submitted to the Tripartite Technical Committee following meetings of Turkey, 
Syria and Iraq in 1984. By offering this plan, Turkey has also extended its 
environmentally acceptable, sustainable approach to the basin-wide use of the Euphrates 
and the Tigris rivers. Turkey has reiterated its proposal during the following meetings of 
the Joint Technical Committee, at the tripartite meeting at the ministerial level on 26 June 
1990, and the bilateral talks with Syria and Iraq in 1993. Unfortunately, as yet, Syria and 
Iraq have not responded to this plan positively.  
Turkey's plan is essentially based on two principles: The first principle is related 
with the Turkish claim about the legal status of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. 
According to the Turkish argument, these two rivers are transboundary waters. This 
rejects the co-sovereignty claim by the downstream riparians. The transboundary 
character of these rivers has been recognized by the riparian states since the 1920s 
because no essential navigation concerns exist. Recognition of the transboundary 
character is contained in a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements: the 1921 
Ankara Agreement, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the 1939 Ankara Agreement, and the 
1946 Ankara Agreement. Since 1980, the Agreed Minutes of the Joint Committee for 
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Economic and Technical Cooperation have accepted that the Tigris and Euphrates are 
“regional waters.” Therefore the three countries need to work together on preparing and 
an assessing a common inventory of water and land resources in the basin. The reason for 
this is that the methods of collecting and interpreting data vary considerably and a unified 
method must be applied when working on a transboundary watercourse.  
In the second principle of the Turkish plan, the idea of viewing the Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers as a single transboundary river system is proposed. Over this issue, Turkey 
has based its argument on two facts. First, these two rivers join at Shatt al-Arab and 
empty into the Gulf as a single river. Second, in Iraq they are artificially joined through 
the Tharthar Canal, so some of the Iraqi land irrigated from the Euphrates can be irrigated 
by means of waters from the Tigris. Keeping these facts in mind, the Turkish government 
suggests that any treaty that will set the conditions for a satisfactory use of the fresh water 
resources in the basin should evaluate the water potentials of the two rivers together and 
should regulate the bases accordingly.     
Following these principles, the Turkish plan consists of inventorying and 
evaluating land and water resources in three stages. In the first stage, inventory studies 
for water resources are planned. These studies will cover activities, such as exchanging 
all the available data pertaining to the levels and discharges at the selected gauging 
stations on the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. The second stage includes the inventory 
studies for land resources. In this step the riparian states are supposed to share the 
information concerning soil classification methods and drainage criteria used and 
practiced in each country. The last stage suggests the evaluation of water and land 
resources, depending on the data that are obtained in the two previous stages. The aim of 
this is to discuss and to determine the irrigation type and system for the planned projects 
in  order to minimize water losses and to investigate the possibilities of modernizing and 
rehabilitating the projects in operation. 81   
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Figure 2. The Dynamic Relations between the Domestic Concerns and   
      International Relations over the Water Issue 82    
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V. SYRIA’S NEED FOR WATER 
 
A. HYDROGRAPHY OF SYRIA 
 
1.   Climate and Water Resources  
 
Water is a scarce resource in Syria as it is throughout the Middle East. More than 
half of the Syrian territories are desert with less than 250 mm of rainfall per year. The 
most important characteristic of the climate prevalent in Syria is the contrast of sea and 
desert conditions. As a consequence of this contrast, there are mainly three types of 
regions with different climates in Syria. The first one is the narrow coastal plain that 
stretches south from the Turkish border to Lebanon. Rainfall in this area is abundant with 
an annual precipitation that ranges between seventy-five and one hundred centimeters. 
The second region is the semiarid steppe zone that lies between the humid Mediterranean 
coast and the arid desert regions. This area, located in the eastern part of the mountains of 
Jabal an Nusayriyah in the north and Anti-Lebanon in the south in Lebanon, is like a 
transition zone between the humid Mediterranean climate and the dry desert climate. 
Since the high ridges of the Jabal an Nusayriyah catch most of the rains from the 
Mediterranean, these areas have relatively arid zones with dry winds and scanty rainfall. 
Along the same parallel, the Anti-Lebanon Mountains in the south bar the rains that come 
from the Mediterranean and the area including the capital city of Damascus becomes part 
of the semiarid climatic zone of the steppe with precipitation averages less than 20 
centimeters a year. The third region, which covers nearly more than half of the Syrian 
territories, are the desert areas with low humidity and annual precipitation of less than ten 
centimeters.83    
Under these climatic conditions, the country’s fresh water resources are of vital 
importance to the domestic consumption, irrigation and industrial purposes. There are 16 
main rivers and tributaries in the country, six of which are main international rivers: 
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· The Euphrates (al-Furat in Arabic) is the largest river in Syria. It comes 
from Turkey and flows to Iraq.   
· The Afrin River in the northwestern part of the country. It comes from 
Turkey, crosses Syria and flows back to Turkey;  
· The Orontes (al-Assi in Arabic) in the western part of the country. It 
comes from Lebanon and flows into Turkey;  
· The Yarmouk in the southwestern part of the country. It receives small 
tributaries Syria and Jordan and forms the border between these two countries before 
flowing into the Jordan river;  
· The al-Kabir River with sources in Syria and Lebanon. It forms the border 
between Syria and Lebanon before flowing to the sea.  
· The Tigris, which forms the border between Syria and Turkey in the 
north-eastern part.  
Among these rivers, Syria is mainly dependent on the Euphrates and to a smaller 
extent on the Tigris, Orontes, and Yarmouk rivers. The Euphrates’ water accounts for as 
much as 86 per cent of the water available to the country. Syria’s major irrigational 
potential lies in the Euphrates River valley and its two major tributaries, the Balikh and 
Khabur rivers in the northeastern portion of the country. This fertile region watered by 
the tributaries of the Euphrates River, is called as Jazirah. The area underwent irrigation 
improvements during the 1960s and 1970s, and it provides substantial cereal and cotton 
crops. The right bank tributaries of the Euphrates, however, are small seasonal streams 
with little contribution to the irrigation potential of the country. 84  
Although figures for water resources are very difficult to obtain due to the lack of 
reliable data, the natural average surface runoff to Syria from international rivers is 
estimated at 28.73 km³/year. The water resources generated from rain falling within the 
country amount to 7 km³/year. Groundwater recharge is about 4.2 km³/year, of which 2 
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km³/year discharges into rivers as spring water. Total groundwater inflow has been 
estimated at 1.35 km³/year, of which 1.2 km³ comes from Turkey and 0.15 km³ comes 
from Lebanon.85 
   
2.   Dams and Lakes  
There are 141 dams in Syria with a total storage capacity of 15.8 km³. The largest 
dam is located at Al-Tabqa on the Euphrates. It forms the Al-Assad Lake with a storage 
capacity of 11.2 km³. Medium-sized dams include the Al-Rastan (225 million m³), the 
Mouhardeh (50 million m³) and the Taldo (15.5 million m³) dams. There are some 20 
dams classified as small, the largest of which is the Dara'a, with a storage capacity of 15 
million m³. The majority of these dams are located near Homs and Hama. Apart from the 
Al-Assad Lake, there are five lakes in Syria, the largest of which is the lake Jabboul near 
Aleppo with a surface area of about 239 km². Lake Qattineh near Homs is the main 
perennial lake in Syria.86  
  
B. DOMESTIC CONCERNS OF SYRIA OVER WATER 
 
1.   Domestic Political Concerns  
 
To get a clearer view of the domestic political concerns of Syria over the water 
issue, first, it is useful to understand how Syrian government perceives the fresh water 
resources in the country. And then, it is necessary to make the distinction if the 
government recognizes the fresh water resources as any of the natural resources or if the 
water issue has some links to other concerns on which the regime cannot.   
Generally, the water resources are directly related to food security. This link, 
between the fresh water and the food security, is more vulnerable in the Middle East due 
to aridity of the region. Because of the scanty rainfalls, the fresh water resources are the 
only way by which the countries can supply their agricultural facilities. In the politically 
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turbulent atmosphere of the Middle East, the relations are based on power politics and 
feeling of distrust is prevalent among the states. Under these circumstances, Syria wants 
to be self-sufficient in all aspects in order to realize its hegemonic aims in the region. For 
example, none of the Arab states, including Syria wants to be dependent on Turkey for 
food supply and water flow. They don’t want Turkey to have an advantage in water issue 
fearing that Turkey may use this advantageous position as a political weapon in the 
region.  
In this struggle of self-sufficiency, the Syrian government views the fresh water 
resources as one of the most important strategic assets. By using the water resources 
efficiently, the regime hopes to be able to maintain the food security and consequently to  
dominate the politics in the region and lead the Arab World while establishing the 
Greater Syria.87  Based on this argument, the Syrian regime has viewed the use of water 
resources in the country as directly linked to itrs national security concern and has aspired 
to maintain and to use these resources at the maximum level.      
In light of these clarifications about the Syrian government’s perceptions of the 
water issue, Syria’s political concerns regarding the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers can 
be explained as two interrelated paths. The first path is the governmental structure of 
Syria in which the functions of the elite, the regime, and the state overlap to the point of 
being indistinguishable. In this ambiguous structure of government, any challenges to the 
elite dominance are perceived as a threat to national security or vice versa. As mentioned 
above, the Syrian regime recognizes the water issue as a national security concern. 
According to the Syrian government, any failure in getting the maximum benefit from the 
water issue would endanger the national security of Syria. And if the national security of 
the state of Syria is jeopardized, the very existence of the regime itself will also be in 
danger. So, in order to secure its own position in the country and to defend the national 
security of Syria, the Syrian government doesn’t want to compromise and insists on a 
permanent solution to the water problem.  
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The second dimension of the Syrian domestic political reasons for its water policy 
derives from the ethnic and sectarian concerns of Syria. Syria has ethnic and religious 
minorities. An estimated 85 percent of the population adheres to some  form of Islam. 
About 13 to 15 percent of Muslims are Alawis. Less then 1 percent of Muslims are Shias 
and the remainders are Sunnis. About 10 percent of the population observes some form of 
Christianity, and about 3 percent is Druzes. There are also small numbers of Jews and 
Yazidis.88 Meanwhile, the ethnic structure of the Syrian society is as colorful as the 
religious structure. The Arabs constitute nearly 90 percent of the population. The Kurds 
are the largest ethnic minority with an estimated 9 percentage. After the Kurds, the 
Armenians are the second largest minority but with a relatively smaller percentage. In 
addition to those, there are also small groups of Turkomans, Circassians, Assyrians, and 
Jews in Syria.89  
Within these ethnic and religious groups, the consciousness of a Syrian nationality 
is not well developed. Among both Arabs and minority groups, primary the individual 
loyalty is to the local ethnic or religious community rather than the government itself. 
This extreme and lack of general coherence has led the government to attempt different 
methods to form the basis of Syrian nationality. For example, the government has tried 
the Arabitization of the population by addressing the Syrians as “descendants of 
Umayyads,” “Arab citizens,” or “brother Arabs.” No official record has been kept that 
shows the ethnic groups. In official affairs, the Syrian government has used the religious 
identities of the groups rather than the ethnic identities.90  
This effort of forming a Syrian nationality, or at least keeping those different 
cultures together under the name of the state of Syria, has become a more difficult task 
because the Syrian regime itself is Alawi dominated. Since the Alawis are religiously in a 
minor position in Syria, this domination of Alewis of the Syrian government has not been 
welcomed especially by the Sunni Muslims, who constitute the religious majority in the 
country as mentioned above, and also by the other minorities since the 1970s. To 
neutralize the dissatisfaction of the other ethnic and religious groups and to keep their 
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loyalties to the regime, the Syrian government has struggled to satisfy the demands of 
those groups, in all aspects including social and economic life. In social life, the other 
groups are given high positions in the regime’s power structure. For example, Prime 
Minister Abd ar Rauf al Kasim and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Hikmat Shibabi were 
only a few of the Sunni Muslims with important offices in the Syrian government in 
1987.91  
In economic life, the satisfaction of those groups has been directly related with the 
water resources of the country. Since the Syrian economy mostly depends on agriculture, 
any failure in maintaining the flow of the Euphrates and to a lesser extent the Tigris River 
may deteriorate of the living standards of those groups. Especially the Sunni Muslims, 
the Assyrians, the Circassians, and the Armenians living along the Euphrates River in the 
northeastern part of the country may be deprived of their agricultural livelihood on which 
they depend heavily. Because of these delicate positions of ethnic and religious groups 
and their economic reliance on the fresh water resources, the Syrian regime has always 
tried to get the maximum share from the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers, and it has 
insisted on a permanent solution and a guarantee of a continuous flow to sustain the 
economic well-being and thus the loyalties of those groups to the government.  
 
2.   Domestic Economic Concerns  
 
The Syrian economic concerns along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are more or 
less the same as Turkey’s concerns. The first of those concerns is the Syrian need for 
water in agriculture. Since agriculture is still the main economic activity and a major 
source of income, foreign exchange and labor in Syria, the economic development of the 
country greatly depends on the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. The 
irrigated area by the Euphrates produces over 50% of the total value of agricultural 
production on about 18.6% of the cultivated land. The al-Jazira region surrounding the 
Euphrates River was sparsely populated until the end of World War II. But with the 
Syrian government’s dam building facilities beginning in the 1960s, the area is now home 
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to about one-fifth of the Syrian population, which was attracted by the employment 
opportunities and wealth generated by the introduction of farming and the expansion of 
agriculture in the region.92 With a population growth rate of 3.4 per cent per annum,93 
which is one of the highest rates in the world, this potential of employment and 
accommodation provided by the Euphrates River is significantly important for Syria.   
The second area of Syrian need for the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers is the 
hydroelectric potential of these rivers. As a first energy source, Syria has oil. With the 
discovery of oil in the Qarah Shuk region in Syria in 1956 by an American oil 
company,94 the Syrian government began to use these oil reserves both economically 
and as a primary source of energy. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, following the 
boom of oil prices in 1973, petroleum played a vital role in Syria’s economy generating 
much needed foreign exchange and in meeting the country’s increasing energy demands. 
With those oil revenues, the Syrian government built new dams, increased the generating 
capacity of the hydroelectric power plants and expanded the electricity production from 
3.7 billion kilowatt-hours in 1980, to 7.3 billion kilowatt-hours in 1984 and 7.6 kilowatt-
hours in 1985. During this period, Syria even exported electricity to Lebanon and 
Jordan.95 
Although the electric power industry was one of the fastest growing sectors of the 
economy in the early 1980s, this did not last long and by 1985, electricity consumption 
outstripped production, forcing power cutbacks of four hours a day throughout the 
country.96 The expansion of electric power distribution in a remarkably short time 
precipitated those electricity crises. As a result of this rapid growth of electric supply, 
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sectoral mismanagements occurred and technical impediments together with the drought 
years, which caused the declining water levels in dams, resulted in the shortage of 
electricity all around the country. 
In the face of those electric crises, the Ministry of Electricity implemented new 
projects to meet the growing demand for energy. It planned extensions of existing power 
stations to expand production. The Baniyas station, completed in 1981 for US$ 140 
million, anticipated a two-turbine, 165-megawatt extension in the late 1980s. The 
Suwaydiyah power station also expected to benefit from a 150-megawatt extension and 
four new turbines. At the Muhradah power station, located west of Hamah and completed 
in 1979, a major extension of totaling US$ 195 million and financed largely by the 
Persian Gulf development agencies was planned. The US$ 97 million Soviet-assisted 
Tishrin power plant and another station near Homs were the other projects of the Syrian 
government in the mid-1980s.97 In addition to those extensions of power plant 
capacities, the government also considered constructing a nuclear power plant with 
Soviet assistance. In the mid-1983, Syria signed a protocol with the Soviet Union to 
conduct feasibility studies and select an appropriate location for the country’s first 
reactor.98 Although nuclear energy promised a solution to Syria’s pressing electric 
shortage, the project had advanced little beyond the design stage by the mid-1980s. The 
reasons for this reluctance over developing the nuclear energy were formidable, 
especially in the wake of Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981. As nuclear 
power became a more costly alternative energy source in the context of volatile Middle 
East politics, the Syrian regime again directed its efforts toward the hydroelectric power 
plants and their enhancement.  
In this second round, the Syrian regime has again tried to increase the capacity of 
the power generating units of the dams.  Since droughts are not uncommon in Syria, and 
these dams are purposed not only for generating electricity but also for supplying 
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irrigation water, these efforts of increasing electricity production fell far short of 
satisfying the demands. For instance, the Energy Ministry’s plans for the 1989-95 period 
projected a production increase to 2,970 megawatts to meet an anticipated demand 
ranging from 1,800 to 2,400 megawatts. But this theoretical excess production would 
barely meet the accumulated shortages of the mid-1980s. Electricity shortages, blackouts, 
and power cuts have remained a prominent feature of Syrian life during the 1990s. Since 
these sufferings in electricity have frustrated industrial development and have impeded 
economic growth in Syria, the Ba’th regime increasingly continued emphasizing the fresh 
water resources of the country especially on the Euphrates River, and insisted on 
maintaining high volumes in the Euphrates that would enable the dams and power plants 
to operate at maximum capacity. Thus, by putting the Euphrates River in the first priority 
in its political agenda, the Syrian government has planned to lessen the electric shortages 
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VI.  IRAQI CONCERNS OVER THE EUPHRATES AND 
TIGRIS RIVERS 
 
A. HYDROGRAPHY OF IRAQ  
 
1.   Climate and Water Resources  
 
Topographically Iraq is shaped like a basin, consisting of the Great Mesopotamian 
alluvial plain of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers. When compared with the other states 
in the region, Iraq has more fresh water resources than most of the Middle Eastern 
countries. Beginning with the ancient Sumerians, the civilizations living in these fertile 
lands developed complex irrigation systems by using the abundant water supply in the 
area. But, as a result of the neglect and bad management of the irrigation networks and 
the environmental degradation, this water potential of Iraq has deteriorated and the waters 
of the Euphrates and Tigris have gained much more importance than ever for the Iraqi 
government both economically and politically.   
The prevalent climate in Iraq is mainly subtropical and semi-arid. Rainfall is very 
seasonal and roughly 90 percent of the annual rainfall occurs between November and 
April, most of it in the winter months from December through March. Except in the north 
and northeastern parts of the country, the mean annual rainfall ranges between ten and 
seventeen centimeters. Rainfall in the mountains is more abundant and may reach 100 
centimeters a year in some places. However, cultivation in these areas is limited 
essentially to the mountain valleys, foothills, and steppes, which have thirty or more 
centimeters of rainfall annually. Minimum temperatures in the winter range from near 
freezing in the northern parts to 2 ºC in the western desert and to 4 ºC in the alluvial 
plains of southern Iraq. Summers are dry and extremely hot with a shade temperature of 
over 43°C during July and August, yet dropping at night to 26°C. The combination of 
rain shortage and extreme heat makes much of Iraq a desert.  Because of these high 
temperatures and as corollary very high rates of evaporation, soil and plants rapidly lose 
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the little moisture obtained from the rain, and vegetation could not survive without 
extensive irrigation.99   
In Iraq, there are mainly three river basins. These are the Euphrates, the Tigris, 
and the Shatt Al-Arab. The Shatt Al-Arab is the river formed by the confluence 
downstream of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers and flows into the Persian Gulf after a 
course of 190 km.100 However, the distribution of these three river basins is not equal in 
the overall geography of Iraq. In general, the water potential of Iraq can be divided into 
four different regions. The first region is the desert in the western and southwestern parts 
of the country. In this area, there are small watercourses that are dry most of the year. The 
second zone is the rolling upland region between the upper Euphrates and Tigris rivers. 
Water in this area flows in deeply cut valleys, and irrigation is much more difficult than it 
is in the lower plain. Much of this zone may be classified as desert. The third region is the 
highlands in the north and in the northeast. The rainfall is adequate in this region for 
agriculture, but because of the high ranging mountains, the agriculture is possible only in 
a few valleys. The fourth zone is the central and southeastern alluvial plain through 
which the Euphrates and the Tigris flow. This whole area is a delta interlaced by the 
channels of the two rivers and by irrigation canals. The area is marshland above the point 
where the two rivers meet at Al-Qurnah. In this area it is also possible to see intermittent 
lakes, which are fed by the rivers in flood seasons.101 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, both the Euphrates and the Tigris are 
international rivers originating in Turkey. The Tigris river basin in Iraq has a total area of 
253,000 km², which corresponds to 54% of the total river basin area. The average annual 
flow of the Euphrates as it enters Iraq is estimated at 30 km³, with a fluctuating annual 
value ranging from 10 to 40 km³. Unlike the Tigris, the Euphrates receives no tributaries 
during its passage in Iraq. About 10 km³ per year are drained into the Hawr al Hammar 
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marshes in the south of the country. For the Tigris, the average annual runoff as it enters 
Iraq is estimated at 21.2 km³. All the Tigris tributaries are on its left bank. From upstream 
to downstream:102  
· The Greater Zab, which originates in Turkey and is partly regulated by the 
Bakhma Dam. It generates 13.18 km³ at its confluence with the Tigris; 62% of the 25.810 
km² of river basin is in Iraq;  
· The Lesser Zab originates in Iran and is equipped with the Dokan Dam 
with a storage capacity of 6.8 km³. The river basin of 21,475 km² (of which 74% is in 
Iraqi territory) generates about 7.17 km³, of which 5.07 km³ of annual safe yield after the 
Dokan construction;  
· The Al-Adhaim (or Nahr Al Uzaym) river, which drains about 13,000 km² 
entirely in Iraq. It generates about 0.79 km³ at its confluence with the Tigris. It is an 
intermittent stream subject to flash floods;  
· The Diyala River originates in Iran and drains about 31,896 km², of which 
75% in Iraqi territory. It is equipped with the Darbandikhan Dam and generates about 
5.74 km³ at its confluence with the Tigris;  
· The Nahr at Tib, Dewarege (Doveyrich) and Shehabi rivers, draining 
together more than 8.000 km². They originate in Iran, and bring together in the Tigris 
about 1 km³ of highly saline waters;  
· The Al-Karkha, whose course is mainly in Iran and, from a drainage area 
of 46,000 km², brings about 6.3 km³ yearly into Iraq, namely into the Hawr Al Hawiza 
during the flood season, and into the Tigris river during the dry season.  
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In addition to those tributaries that feed the Tigris, the Karun River, originating in 
Iran flows with its mean annual flow of 24.7 km³ into the Shatt Al-Arab.103 It brings a 
large amount of fresh water into the Shatt Al-Arab, just before it reaches the sea.  
The Euphrates and the Tigris rivers are subject to large and possibly disastrous 
floods. The level of water in the Tigris can rise at the rate of over 30 cm/hour. In the 
southern part of the country, immense areas are regularly inundated, levees often 
collapse, and villages and roads must be built on high embankments. In order to increase 
water transport efficiency, minimize losses and water logging, and improve water quality, 
a number of new watercourses were constructed, especially in the southern part of the 
country. The Saddam River (or Third River) is one of those new watercourses. It 
functions as a main out- fall drain collecting drainage waters of more than 1.5 million 
hectares of agricultural land from north of Baghdad to the Gulf, between the Euphrates 
and the Tigris. The length of the watercourse, completed in December 1992, is 565 km, 
with a total discharge of 210 m3/s. Other watercourses were also constructed to reclaim 
new lands or to reduce water logging.104  
2.   Dams and Lakes  
In 1977, the on-river dams, all of which are located in the Tigris river basin, had a 
total capacity of 13.7 km³. There was an important program of dam construction in Iraq 
in the 1980s. The program consisted of the construction of the Saddam Dam on the Tigris 
with a storage capacity of 11.1 km³, the Kadisiyya (Qadisia) multipurpose dam on the 
Euphrates which would keep 8.2 km³ water, the Bakhma dam on the Greater Zab, with a 
17.1 km³ reservoir capacity, the Badush dam on the Tigris river, 0.5 km³ storage capacity, 
and several other desert dams totaling about 0.5 km³. The total on-river storage capacities 
for the Tigris will thus amount to 42 km³, and 8.2 km³ for the Euphrates River. At 
present, the Al-Adom dam on the Tigris River, with a capacity of 3.8 km³, is under 
construction. In addition to those on river dams, two off-river storage lakes have been 
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established with the construction of the Tharthar Dam in the Tigris River. These are filled 
with the Wadi Tharthar waters and, since 1985 with Euphrates waters. Finally, the 
Habbaniya Dam which can be filled from upstream Euphrates waters and which drains 
into the Euphrates downstream, was constructed.105  
 
B. DOMESTIC CONCERNS OF IRAQ OVER WATER   
 
1.   Domestic Political Concerns  
The domestic political concerns of Iraq over the water issue parallel Syria’s 
concerns. These concerns are related directly to the national security of Iraq. This direct 
link between the water issue and the national security of Iraq derives from two reasons, 
which are mostly the same in the Syrian example. 
The first one is the state structure of Iraq in which the regime and the state are 
inseparable from each other. The Saddam regime perceives itself as the state and defines 
its policies accordingly. Since “the water resources are of critical urgency to the Iraq’s 
agriculture and economy,”106 any failure in maintaining the flow in the Euphrates and 
the Tigris rivers threatens the regime’s survivability, which is already in question. 
Although agriculture was overwhelmed by the expansion of the oil sector, it still 
continues to be the primary economic activity of the people in Iraq. In addition to these 
facts, agriculture is important for Iraq in terms of being self-sufficient and maintaining 
food security, which are the most important conditions for states, such as Iraq and Syria, 
in their efforts to lead the Arab World and dominate the politics in the Middle East. 
Under these circumstances, the Ba’ath regime in Iraq perceives the Euphrates and the 
Tigris rivers as highly strategic resources to be maintained and tries to secure the 
maximum benefit from those resources at the expense of even deteriorating relations with 
the upper stream states of Syria and Turkey. 
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The second reason that urges the regime to give the utmost importance to the 
water issue is the fact that Iraq is not a homogenous nation-state. Although it is difficult 
to obtain reliable data from the Saddam regime, in which all state statistics are treated as 
state secrets, the estimates indicate that 76 percent of the Iraqi people are Arab, 19 
percent are Kurds, while Turkomans, Assyrians, Armenians, and other relatively small 
groups comprise the rest. Religiously, there are as many different groups as the ethnic 
ones in the Iraqi population. Nearly 95 percent of the population is Muslim and the rest 
are Christians, Yazidis, and a few Jews. In the Muslim population approximately 65 
percent is Shi’as and 30 percent is Sunni Muslims.107 This picture of ethnically and 
religiously diversified Iraqi society makes it rather difficult for the minority Saddam 
regime, which is Sunni Muslim, to gain support from other ethno-religious groups inside 
the country. Domestic security policy implies a strong security apparatus around the 
regime due to the lack of trust toward other ethno-religious groups. Since many of the 
Shi’as reside in the Euphrates and Tigris basin in southern Iraq and benefit from the 
irrigation schemes and the agricultural production,108 any loss in the flow of the 
Euphrates and the Tigris rivers would degrade the living conditions of the Shi’as. Since 
the Sunni Muslim dominated Ba’ath regime has never been welcomed by the Shi’a, the 
degradation of living conditions in the Euphrates-Tigris basin in southern Iraq would be a 
good justification for the Shi’ite community to oppose the government in order to end the 
Sunni Muslim domination in the country. 109 
The Tigris and Euphrates diversion scheme can be shown as an example of the 
Saddam regime’s intentions of using the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers as tools to 
marginalize the ethno-religious groups in order to maintain the stability of the regime in 
the country. In this complex diversion scheme, the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq certainly 
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do experience the effects of the Iraqi government’s continuing effort to drain the 
marshland. The so-called River Project was conceived as a land improvement project in 
the 1950s. Iraq began to carry out the project in the 1970s in order to desalinate the 
Euphrates water. The 565-kilometer Saddam River, between the Tigris and the Euphrates, 
which starts near Baghdad and ends near to Basra in the south, is designed to reclaim 
polluted land by washing it with the surplus irrigation water. The regime of Saddam 
Hussein has, however, clearly shown that the intention behind the complex Tigris and 
Euphrates diversion scheme was not only to improve the agricultural sector. Large areas 
of agricultural land in the Amara region have been flooded deliberately. At the same time 
the marshes in the south are being drained. The flood weapon is thereby double-edged; 
the deliberate flooding of the agricultural lands deprived the Marsh Arabs of their basic 
economic activity and the drying marshes make the Marsh Arabs an easy target for 
Saddam Hussein’s forces. Iraqi opposition groups portray this action of the Saddam 
regime as a new tactic in its effort to subdue the south and the reaction from the Marsh 
Arabs has been to declare a “hydro-jihad” against the Baghdad regime.110  
 
2.   Domestic Economic Concerns   
 
The domestic economic concerns of Iraq over the use of the Euphrates and the 
Tigris rivers can be examined in two folds. The first area which puts the two rivers into 
the top priority list of the Iraqi government is the irrigation potential of the  rivers for 
developing agriculture and the domestic use of these fresh water resources by the rapidly 
increasing urban population. The second Iraqi concern is the hydroelectric energy that 
can be produced in the power plants built on those rivers.  
Agriculture is still the main economic activity in Iraq providing employment and 
sustenance for a significant portion of its population. Iraq, has the second- largest 
agricultural potential in North Africa and the Middle East, after Sudan. However, by the 
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mid-1980s, Iraq was importing 80 percent of its food requirements; in 1987 food imports 
accounted for 26.7 percent of Iraq’s total imports. Iraq’s growing dependence on food 
imports has been further accentuated by the damage to its irrigation system in the recent 
wars. After its war with Iran and the Gulf War, only one major project, the Derbandi 
Kahm Dam was relatively undamaged. The Dokan and the Haditha Dams were 75 
percent destroyed, and the Ramade Barrage, Saddam, and Samara Dams were totally 
inoperable.111 Although Iraq has managed to repair some of these facilities, restoration 
of the full water supply capacity is likely to take many years. Another factor that 
increased the importance of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers for the Iraqi government 
is the United Nations’ trade embargo since August 1990. A side effect of this embargo 
may be to impel Baghdad to seek total food security within its territory in the future. 
Given the fact that about 80 percent of all water currently withdrawn in Iraq already goes 
to agriculture and related activities, this situation places more demand on the Iraqi water 
resources even assuming that Iraq continues to receive the amount of water it currently 
does from the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. 
 In addition to the need for agricultural use, the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers are 
of vital importance to the Iraqi regime for domestic use. Mainly because of the 
availability of water, most of Iraq’s urban centers and a large portion of its population 
were located along and near the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. This trend has continued in 
the modern times and is not likely to change significantly in the foreseeable future. A 
high rate of urbanization, propelled by natural growth of the urban population and 
internal migration, implies a rising demand for water for households and for industrial 
and service sector needs. In the face of those increasing water needs, Iraq is in dire need 
of good-quality drinking water as well as water for maintaining sewage and waste 
disposal systems for its urban population. All the urban centers in Iraq are currently 
supplied mainly from the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. The largest cities of Iraq 
located in the basin, such as Baghdad and Mosul, and the populations in several other 
cities located along the Euphrates are growing at rates far higher than the rural areas. This 
                                                 
111 J. A. Allan, “Overall Perspectives on Countries and Regions” in Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon,  
       (eds.)Water in theArab World: Perspectives and Prognoses, (Santa Monica: Harvard University   
       Press, 1994) p. 68.  
71 
is fast multiplying the demand for fresh water in the urban areas. In Mosul alone, the per 
capita water consumption is expected to rise from 230 litres per day in 1974 to 330 litres 
per day by the year 2002.112  
The issue of deteriorating water quality is another serious problem that Iraq has 
been facing for the last decade. A consequence of irrigation over thousands of years, 
salinity has become a major problem and currently affects 65 percent of all irrigated lands 
in Iraq.113 Without an adequate supply of running fresh water the soils cannot be washed 
of the accumulated saline deposits. These problems will be further compounded if the 
flow of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers declines. 
The second economic concern that increases the importance of the Euphrates and 
the Tigris rivers for the Iraqi government is the increasing electric needs of the country. 
Iraqi electric consumption increased by a factor of fourteen between 1968 and 1988, and 
it was expected to double every four to five years in the late 1990s.114 Ongoing rural 
electrification, which included about 7,000 villages throughout the country, contributed 
to this increased demand.115 The destruction of power generating facilities first in the 
war with Iran and second in the Gulf War further aggravated the need for electricity in 
Iraq. Different from Turkey and Syria, Iraq is richly endowed with petrochemical 
resources. The total national petroleum reserves are estimated at about six percent of the 
world total. From 1972, Iraq was capable of producing up to 500, 000 barrels of oil per 
day. However, Iraq suffered a severe blow during the eight-year war with Iran when oil 
shipments through the Persian Gulf were halted and again during the Gulf War when 
much of the country’s oil refining and export capacity was destroyed.116 The continuing 
UN embargo on the export of petroleum products has also deprived Iraq of the much-
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needed financial resources for reconstructing its damaged power generating facilities. In 
addition to the before mentioned dam-building facilities, the Saddam regime tried 
different alternatives, one of which was nuclear power plants, to meet the increasing 
energy demands. But Iraq’s plans to develop a nuclear generating capacity were set 
back117 by Israel’s June 1981 bombing of the Osiraq reactor, then under 
construction.118  
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VII. LEGAL ASPECTS 
 
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS 
 
1.   Sources Of International Law and Legal Principles 
 
International rivers pose a particular problem in the context of international law. 
A river system, unlike isolated natural resources like minerals or petroleum, is a part of 
complex hydrological unit. The water environment in an upstream country has a direct 
effect on the nature of the river downstream, and vice versa. Occurrences, both natural 
and man-made which affect the water resources in one part of the watershed have the 
potential to change the quantity, quality, or use of the water in another part of the 
watershed. These ecological and developmental threats to the world’s rivers have 
transferred the issue of managing and developing transboundary water resources from the 
perspective of natural resource problems to international concern. To get a clearer view 
about the possibilities of using the international law as an instrument in developing and 
managing the transboundary water resources, first the sources of international law will be 
defined and then the magnitude of the problems will be handled within the light of the 
international water law treaties.   
  Contemporary international law is based on the distinction between internal 
matters, which are the concern of the individual state, and matters of international 
importance over which no single state has exclusive jurisdiction. The relations between 
states and international organizations as well as certain relations between individuals and 
states are generally regulated by the international law. There are basically four 
fundamental sources of international law. These are: 119  
· International treaties and conventions 
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· International custom or “customary international law” 
· General principles of law recognized by civilized nations 
· Judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified writers of various 
nations     
It is a commonplace that international treaties are legally binding on the states 
which are parties to the treaties. On the other hand, customary international law develops 
over time and the practice of nations eventually becomes binding on all, whether or not 
the respective nations are party to a formal agreement. The treaties and conventions are 
regarded as the primary evidence of international law. When a dispute occurs, the 
precedence is generally given to the treaties and conventions when they are in conflict 
with a provision of customary law.120 
 Centuries of water conflict have demonstrated that the use and management of 
single rivers or lakes does not realistically reflect regional water problems. Therefore a 
broader concept has been developed through the 20th century. By these developments, 
international water law has defined inland water basins by geographic watersheds and has 
taken into account surface as well as underground water flows. The standard literature of 
international water management applies five principles of equal importance regarding the 
judgement of demands on a basin. These are121 
· The principle of absolute sovereignty (the Harmon Doctrine) 
· Absolute territorial integrity 
· The principle of prior appropriation  
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· The “sic utere” doctrine (restricted territorial sovereignty and restricted 
territorial integrity) 
· The concept of community of interests (sovereignty restricted by 
consideration for the interests or integrity of other states) 
The states support one of these principles depending mainly on their position with 
relation to the water sources. The first principle of “absolute sovereignty” is 
advantageous to the upstream state because it regards water bodies as an integral part of a 
state’s national territory. This principle is also referred as the Harmon Doctrine, which 
was applied to a dispute between the United States and Mexico in 1895 over the polluting 
of the Rio Grande by the United States. Under this doctrine, an upstream state can freely 
deplete or use a river’s flow within its boundaries. Thus, upstream states maintain the 
right to use unlimited quantities of the water resources that originate in their territories. 
Based on this argument, claims by a dissenting downstream state are rejected as 
interference in its domestic affairs. This legal doctrine, however, has become disfavored 
as a narrow view for reconciling differences among opposing states where a shared 
natural resources is at issue.122   
Meanwhile, the downstream states prefer the second principle of absolute 
integrity that allows them to accuse and perhaps even censure, the upstream state for 
illegally taking measures that are disadvantageous to its territory. Here, the downstream 
riparian claims the right to unaltered flows, potentially limiting any upstream 
development. Clearly, when these two principles of international law come into conflict, 
they do not permit a reconciliation of interests. Like the Harmon Doctrine, this theory has 
also received little support among the international legal community. It is viewed that the 
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theory is inequitably placing a burden on upper riparians without exacting a similar duty 
on lower riparians.123  
The third principle is “prior appropriation,” which favors neither the upstream nor 
the downstream state, but rather the state that puts the water to use first, thereby 
protecting those uses which existed prior in time. Each state along a watercourse may 
thus be able to establish prior rights to use a certain amount of water depending on the 
date upon which that water use began. In doing so, however, the principle may be 
inequitable where one state lags behind another in the economic or technical ability to 
develop its river use. Further, in rewarding those who first put water to use, the doctrine 
does not take into account either thorough planning or environmental uses of the river. 
Consequently, although the doctrine is the legal basis for the allocation of water resources 
in the western United States, it has received little international support.124 
In addition to these three legal theories, which have been developed in direct 
response to international watercourse allocation, there is also the “sic utere theory” that 
has its roots in the traditional customary law. According to this customary law principle, 
one state may engage in some activity to the extent that it does not bring harm to another 
state. The river use that causes substantial harm to another riparian is accepted as 
unlawful where the harm outweighs the equitable reasons in favor of that use The sic 
utere doctrine is reflected in international water law theory through the principles of 
“restricted territorial sovereignty” and “restricted territorial integrity.” These two 
principles mean that every state is free to use its territorial water provided that it in no 
way prejudices the rights and uses of other riparian states. The “sic utere doctrine” is 
widely accepted as a basis for international law. This doctrine also maintains the basis for 
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the most current attempt at codification of law about the non-navigational use of 
international watercourses.125          
The fifth principle in the international law regarding the judgment of demands on 
a basin is the concept of “community of interests.” According to this concept, within a 
water basin each state has a right of action against any other basin state, so that no state 
may affect the resource without the cooperation and permission of its neighbors. While 
current attempts at codification are directed toward facilitating this goal, it is not yet a 
politically acceptable or favored position.   
After explaining the general sources of the international law and the legal theories 
about the management of the transboundary watercourses, now it will be useful to clarify 
the categories of international waterways according to their functions. Mainly 
international watercourses (IWC) have three functions. The first usage area of IWC is as 
boundaries between states. This can be achieved by following a shore of an IWC, by 
cutting across its waters, or by using the waterway as a reference for drawing a boundary. 
The second function of IWC is for navigation purposes between states. The third one is 
for non-navigational uses such as irrigation and production of hydroelectric energy.126 
The problems that will be handled in this section are related to the IWC, which fall into 
the third category.     
 2.   Helsinki Rules and the U.N. Convention on Transboundary Rivers  
 As mentioned before, international water law that deals with the non-navigational 
transboundary watercourses has been developed recently. The first remarkable action in 
this arena was the Helsinki Rules of 1966. In Helsinki, International Law Association 
(ILA) provided a guideline for the equitable and reasonable uses of international 
watercourses (IWC). As a fundamental principle for state practices, it demands that all 
repercussions resulting from interventions in a ‘hydrographic unity’ regarding the use of 
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basins be recorded, assessed and evaluated. In this regard the Helsinki Rules is an 
essential document that sets the course for international water law. It was founded on the 
principles of integrity and restricted sovereignty and provides further basis for the 
equitable apportionment and use doctrine. The most important standards set by the 
Helsinki Rules are127 
· The obligation to carry out reasonable compensation measures if the 
interests of states have been violated;  
· The consideration of all relevant technical, economic and financial factors 
while planning and carrying out a project;  
· The requirement to inform all riparians of a pending project;  
· The observation of an appropriate waiting period before the construction 
of a project is started;  
· The collection and open exchange of data;  
· The arbitration of objections by means of consultative committees and 
arbitration commissions;  
· The rejection of all absolute use restrictions or requirements  
 In the Helsinki Rules, the concept of “International Drainage Basin” was 
accepted and with Article IV, each basin state is given the right to use the “International 
Drainage Basin” reasonably, equitably, and beneficially. The importance of Article IV 
was that, for the first time the idea of using the international waters beneficially rather 
than water per se was decided in the international law. In the Article V, the factors that 
define the equitable and reasonable uses of the transboundary rivers were presented. 
 In 1970, the UN handled the issue of IWC when the problems emerged with the 
term of “International Drainage Basin.” Some states such as China, Brazil, Belgium, and 
France objected to the idea of international drainage basin claiming that this would be an 
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interference to the sovereignty of the states. In order to settle the conflicts, the UN 
assigned its legal advisory body, the International Law Commission (ILC) to prepare a 
codification for the uses of non-navigational transboundary watercourses. After a period 
of 27 years, ILC prepared 32 draft articles for non-navigational uses of the IWC. In 1997, 
these draft articles were accepted by UN as “The Convention on Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.”128 This convention was more or less 
a redecleration of the Helsinki Rules of 1966. Article IV of the Helsinki Rules that has 
stipulated the “equitable and reasonable use” of the watercourse was repeated in the UN 
Convention with Article V. The new point in UN’s Convention that was not mentioned in 
the Helsinki Rules was the Article VII, which asserted the obligation not to cause 
significant harm to downstream riparian while using the river basin. 
 
B. ARGUMENTS OF TURKEY, SYRIA, IRAQ AND THE INTERNATIONAL     
            WATER LAW 
 
Iraq bases its arguments on the principle of prior appropriation. Iraqi authorities 
claim that Iraq has acquired rights relating to its ancestral irrigations on the Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers. According to Iraq, two dimensions of acquired rights exist. One outlines the 
fact that for thousands of years these rivers have given life to the inhabitants of 
Mesopotamia and thus constitute an acquired right for this people. Therefore no upstream 
riparian country is entitled to take away the rights of these inhabitants. The second 
dimension of acquired rights stems from the existing irrigations and water installations. 
Iraq has 1.9 million hectares of agricultural land in the Euphrates basin. Iraq maintains 
that it has established irrigation installations, including the ancestral irrigation systems 
left from the Sumerians times, to irrigate these lands.129   
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Along the same line with Iraqi claims, Syrian authorities also lay their arguments 
on the principle of prior appropriation asserting that Syria has possessed acquired rights 
dating from antique periods over the rivers that pass thorough Syrian territory. The 
second Syrian argument over its rights on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers has its roots in 
the principle of absolute territorial integrity. Based on this principle, Syria claims that the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers are international watercourses which can be classified as 
shared resources. According to Syrian claims, the waters of those rivers must be shared 
among the riparian states according to the quota to be determined.  
In response to those arguments of the lower riparian states, Turkey sticks to 
Article V of the UN Convention claiming that it is using the waters of the Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers equitably and reasonably. Although the Harmon Doctrine of absolute 
sovereignty supports the Turkey’s position as an upper stream state, Turkey does not 
accept the idea of depleting the waters of the two rivers regardless of any affect on the 
other riparian states and favors negotiating the issue with Syria and Iraq.130  
In resolving the conflicts about the uses of the disputed waters, including the 
Euphrates-Tigris case, the UN Convention has not proven so successful. There are 
several reasons for this failure. First, these rules are not applicable to every specific case. 
Since the water problems are intermingled with regional politics in each case, it becomes 
difficult to apply these rules to the politically charged disputes of water basins. Second 
there is no legal enforcement mechanism that will provide the UN with the ability of 
controlling the behaviors of the riparian states in terms of appropriateness to the 
international law. As a general rule, international courts do not have compulsory 
jurisdiction to deal with international legal disputes. Sometimes even at the presence of 
an international law that regulates certain topics between states, states can behave in 
conflict with the international norms because of their own social, political, economic or 
security concerns. As a result of this lack of enforcement mechanism, these rules have not 
been so effective in practice in solving the disputes as they are on paper. 
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The other fact that contributes to the failure of the UN Convention in resolving 
the disputes is the ambiguity between articles. The articles decided by the ILC provide 
both upper stream and down stream states with enough legal rights to defend their own 
arguments. For example in the case of Euphrates-Tigris Basin, Article V and Article VII 
of the UN Convention of 1997 enable both sides to defend their rights depending on the 
legal facts. Article V mentions about the “equitable and reasonable” use of the river, 
while Article VII suggests “not to cause significant harm” to other riparian while using 
the rivers. Since the criteria for using the rivers equitably and reasonably without giving 
significant harm to other riparians were not explained clearly in the UN Convention, 
Turkey while implementing GAP project bases its arguments on Article V claiming that 
it is using the waters of the two rivers equitably and reasonably. However, Syria and Iraq 
base their arguments on Article VII claiming that Turkey is significantly harming the 
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VIII.        CONCLUSION 
 
A. THE RELATIONS AMONG TURKEY, SYRIA, AND IRAQ  
 
“The relations between three riparian states of the Euphrates-Tigris basin can be 
described only as complex.”131 The issues that shape this complex web of relations can 
be stated as follows: 
· The economic, political, and ethnic concerns of each state on the domestic 
level 
· Strategic concerns and power policies of the respective states on the 
international level      
· Consequences of significant events that changed the picture of political 
relations in the region, such as the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War 
· Economic difficulties in the region and the increasing need for natural 
resources such as oil and water 
When the issues that comprise the relations between the riparian states of the 
Euphrates-Tigris basin are examined, it becomes apparent that these issues are inter-
related and any change in one of them can affect the others in significant degrees. The 
water issue and water needs of each riparian state as only one component of this set of 
relations can serve both as a catalyst or an obstacle in maintaining the stability in the 
region. 
The relations between Turkey and Syria are dominated by the differences in their 
worldviews and divergent state interests with respect to specific issues.132 These 
divergent worldviews had their roots during the Cold War. Since Turkey became a 
NATO member in 1952, Syria has always considered Turkey as part of the western 
power in the region. Turkey’s close relations with the United States and its increasing 
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cooperation with Israel emerged as a thorny issue between Turkey and Syria. With the 
implementation of GAP project, the relations between Turkey and Syria were further 
strained. As leverage to Turkey’s water policy, Syria began supporting the PKK, which 
has been active in the southeastern part of Turkey since 1984. This Syrian support for the 
PKK terrorist organization and the ongoing dam projects on the Euphrates River 
especially caused some tensions between the two states.   
The relations between Turkey and Iraq can be divided into two main periods: 
before the Gulf War and after the Gulf War. Before the Gulf War, despite their very 
different regimes and foreign policy orientations, the relations between the two countries 
were cooperative and pragmatic on most issues. There was a natural economic link based 
on the delivery of oil and the potential for commerce. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, 
because of Turkey’s support for the Gulf War coalition, these economic relations decayed 
and Turkey was deprived of the Iraqi oil. On the Kurdish issue both countries are sharing 
the same opinion: to contain Kurdish separatism and to keep both Turkey and Iraq intact. 
In the water issue, the most southeastern riparian in the Euphrates-Tigris basin, Iraq has a 
vulnerable position. Although water problems, based on Turkey’s progressive 
construction of the GAP project, have caused some tensions between the two countries, 
they have never been serious enough to disrupt the relations between two countries. Iraq 
has always directed its accusations and claims about the water issue to Syria rather than 
Turkey.133    
The relations between Syria and Iraq have been based on the regional ambitions 
and political rivalries between the two Ba’ath regimes in Damascus and Baghdad.134 
The ideals of the Ba’ath regimes were expected to move in the same direction, but the 
ethno-religious groups dominated the relations between two Ba’ath regimes. The Alawi-
dominated Ba’ath Party in Syria and the Sunni-dominated Ba’ath Party in Iraq have 
always pursued conflicting policie s in the region. We saw these conflicting views both in 
the Iraq-Iran War and the Gulf War. In both of these wars, Syria did not support Iraq 
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because Syris followed its own political and strategic objectives. Both political systems 
and leaders have strived to present a Middle East agenda. Syrian claims are based on the 
argument that Syria has always been the heartland of Arab nationalism and must lead an 
Arab unity in the region. On the other hand, the Iraqi regime has tried to consolidate its 
position in the Arab World by affecting the politics. These diverging interests between 
Syria and Iraq can be seen on the water issue. Syria accuses Turkey of not thinking of the 
downstream states while implementing its projects in the Euphrates basin, and then Syria  
significantly harms Iraq by diverting the waters of the Euphrates for Syrian projects. For 
example, as mentioned in Chapter III, in 1975 when Syria filled the Tabqa dam, Iraq 
became desperately deprived of the waters of the Euphrates River and this brought  Iraq 
and Syria to the brink of war135. Only through the efforts of Saudi Arabia and the former 
Soviet Union the war was prevented.  
After looking at the relations among the three riparian states of the Euphrates-
Tigris basin, one sees that it significant concerns of these three states are apparently quite 
similar. Because of these similarities in the overall objectives of the three states, any 
cooperation among them on any subject, especially the water issue becomes difficult. The 
general factors that prevent any cooperation between these states can be summarized as 
follows: 
· Relations are dominated by power politics 
· States aspire to regional hegemony 
· A common feeling of distrust is prevalent among them  
· Each seeks to be self-sufficient 
For these reasons, each riparian state prefers less than optimal solutions in order 
to secure its own national interests. This thesis demonstrates that since water is important 
to all three states, generally for the same reasons, they pursue their own national agenda 
about using the Euphrates-Tigris basin. They believe domestic political stability and 
economic advancement is more profitable than a basin-wide cooperation that will satisfy 
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the demands of each riparian. It is this self-serving cost-benefit mindset that dictates the 
political behaviors of the riparian states of the Euphrates-Tigris basin. 
 
B.        SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS  
            WATER  CONFLICT  IN THE MIDDLE EAST   
Increasing pressures on the water and energy resources of the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin have caused conflicts among the riparian states in the basin. These conflicts have 
been and will continue to be inextricably intertwined with the issues of identity, national 
sovereignty and security; interstate rivalry and ideological competition; demands for 
autonomy and independence; economic well-being, and political power. Water issues 
already impinge very directly on the quest for environmental, economic, and food 
security in all the riparian states. Even if the riparian states do not engage in war over the 
water, the ruling regimes will continue to contest claims over the transboundary water 
resources to justify their antagonism and political strategies.    
After this analyses cooperation between the riparian states of the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin is obviously indispensable in order to resolve the region’s conflicts and maintain 
stability. To achieve this task, unfortunately, the international law and institutions do not 
maintain a clear framework that will satisfy the needs of all riparian states. Therefore, it 
becomes the responsibility of the concerned countries to develop a solution to their 
problems. In seeking a solution to the problems of the Euphrates-Tigris rivers,  
sometimes the relations among the states become strained. However, despite these 
problems, war seems improbable. Although rhetoric about “water wars” in the Middle 
East has increased in the last decade, war is unlikely for several valid reasons. First, water 
issue alone cannot be reason enough for waging a war amid this complex web of 
relations. Second, Turkey’s military capability presents a good deterrence for both Syria 
and Iraq.136 Third, Turkey’s NATO membership and its good relations with the United 
States, and the Arab’s lack of support for Syria and Iraq on this issue compel Syria and 
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Iraq to maintain the status quo and to find a solution to the problem of sharing the 
Euphrates and the Tigris rivers.  
The most important conclusion must be that the states in the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin can best solve their water problems by cooperating on developing the water 
systems in an equitable and peaceful manner. Joint dependency on shared river systems 
decreases the possibilities of implementing national development strategies. Thus, 
management institutions on a regional level are required in order to safeguard both 
development and security in the basin. The three riparian states of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq 
could arrange tripartite meetings for development planning, which could become a model 
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